The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence

As proven by the recent discovery of ongoing research and tests in India and Pakistan, the nuclear age is not dead. Nuclear weapons, deployed in plentiful numbers during the Cold War by the Americans and Soviets, and, in lesser numbers, by others, were nevertheless controlled in their use by the essential equivalence, of U.S. and Soviet strategic power and by the ability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to dominate the international security environment by means of their global military power. Now the setting within which nuclear weapons exist has been transformed. Now that the Cold War has ended, and the Soviet Union has vanished, states seeking nuclear weapons operate under decision making rules that are sometimes opaque to Western observers. If the end of the Cold War leads to the unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons, Cimbala stresses that a combination of military hubris and arms control insolvency could lead to new nuclear crises or worse. The author provides a provocative analysis for policy makers and professional military staff as well as scholars and researchers involved with international relations, security studies, and arms control.

Table of Contents:
Introduction The Nuclear Chimera: How Deterrence Really Worked Navies in the Cuban Missile Crisis: Weapons of Restraint? Russia's Nuclear Dependence and START Realism and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Information Warfare and Nuclear Deterrence Limited Nuclear War in the Old and New World Orders Conclusion: The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence Suggested Reading Index

About the Author :
STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Delaware County. He has contributed to the literature of international relations and U.S. security and defense policy for more than 20 years, and he has written or edited more than 30 books. Among his latest publications are Collective Insecurity (Greenwood, 1995) and Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense (Praeger, 1996). In addition, Cimbala serves on the editorial review boards of several journals, including Armed Forces and Society.

Review :
.,."well balanced in regard to description and analysis, prudently organized, and meticulously argued, while at the same time written in lucid and crisp prose. This acount can be warmly recommended to any eager scholar of nuclear deterrence theory or, indeed, anyone interested in the history of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy."-Studies in Conflict & Terrorism ?...well balanced in regard to description and analysis, prudently organized, and meticulously argued, while at the same time written in lucid and crisp prose. This acount can be warmly recommended to any eager scholar of nuclear deterrence theory or, indeed, anyone interested in the history of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy.?-Studies in Conflict & Terrorism ?Cimbala provides important arguments in favor of the logic of deterrence versus the logic of nonproliferation in a very straifhtforward manner. This volume needs to be read by academics and policymakers alike. Its clear and relatively idiom-free prose makes it accessible to students interested in regionalized conflict. It should be required reading for anyone with an interest in this most important issue.?-American Political Science Review ?Cimbala provides sound research that greatly contributes to ongoing discussions of nuclear deterrence.?-Military Review ?Cimbala's work challenges the reader to consider national policiese and plans regarding smaller nuclear wars....This well researched book is strongly recommended for the military professional and for the student of international affairs.?-Naval War College Review ..."well balanced in regard to description and analysis, prudently organized, and meticulously argued, while at the same time written in lucid and crisp prose. This acount can be warmly recommended to any eager scholar of nuclear deterrence theory or, indeed, anyone interested in the history of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy."-Studies in Conflict & Terrorism "Cimbala provides sound research that greatly contributes to ongoing discussions of nuclear deterrence."-Military Review "Cimbala's work challenges the reader to consider national policiese and plans regarding smaller nuclear wars....This well researched book is strongly recommended for the military professional and for the student of international affairs."-Naval War College Review "Cimbala provides important arguments in favor of the logic of deterrence versus the logic of nonproliferation in a very straifhtforward manner. This volume needs to be read by academics and policymakers alike. Its clear and relatively idiom-free prose makes it accessible to students interested in regionalized conflict. It should be required reading for anyone with an interest in this most important issue."-American Political Science Review