Managing Command and Control in the Persian Gulf War

During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed.

Table of Contents:
Abbreviations Introduction The Black Hole and Its Impact in Desert Shield The TACC and GAT in Desert Storm Bomb Damage Assessment and Command and Control of the Air Campaign Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner as the First Joint Force Air Component Commander Conclusion Appendix: "Black Hole" Strategic Air Campaign Planners Notes on Sources Index

About the Author :
MARK D. MANDELES is President of the J. de Bloch Group. THOMAS C. HONE is a member of the faculty of the George C. Marshall Center. SANFORD S. TERRY is Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force.

Review :
?[A] major contribution to the command and control literature. Put simply, the authors have written the most exhaustive examination of the Gulf war air command and control experience yet published, going beyond the detail to analyze what it means. The authors' primary interest was to examine how chaos in planning and directing operations was managed--particularly by an Air Force leadership in-theater that was skeptical of the quality of their command and control support and believed in putting their highly personal stamp on problem solving.... The conclusions of the analysis offer aphorisms that future air planners and JFACCs probably know already but need to keep in mind. . . The critique of scripted air power application is the best that this reviewer has seen. . . . This book should be on the shelf of any current or aspiring JFACC. It tells us what must be fixed and what must be avoided when we next enter combat, particularly if we face an enemy more capable than Saddam Hussein.?-Naval War College Review ?[T]his is an important and useful work that would be of great benefit to scholars and military officers alike.?-The Journal of Military History ?No one has offered a better conceptual understanding, uncovered the mystery of organization and personal interaction, and accomplished the task with an interesting flair, than this trio of authors. The book's success derives from the insightful focus on the Gulf War's air leadership and the process it followed to control the air war.... This is one of the best Gulf War books becuase it explains where leadership lay in that conflict and, with that insight, encourages us to reexamine past wars....a must for those who lead air forces or work with them in the joint arenea.?-Air Power History "ÝA¨ major contribution to the command and control literature. Put simply, the authors have written the most exhaustive examination of the Gulf war air command and control experience yet published, going beyond the detail to analyze what it means. The authors' primary interest was to examine how chaos in planning and directing operations was managed--particularly by an Air Force leadership in-theater that was skeptical of the quality of their command and control support and believed in putting their highly personal stamp on problem solving.... The conclusions of the analysis offer aphorisms that future air planners and JFACCs probably know already but need to keep in mind. . . The critique of scripted air power application is the best that this reviewer has seen. . . . This book should be on the shelf of any current or aspiring JFACC. It tells us what must be fixed and what must be avoided when we next enter combat, particularly if we face an enemy more capable than Saddam Hussein."-Naval War College Review "ÝT¨his is an important and useful work that would be of great benefit to scholars and military officers alike."-The Journal of Military History "[T]his is an important and useful work that would be of great benefit to scholars and military officers alike."-The Journal of Military History "No one has offered a better conceptual understanding, uncovered the mystery of organization and personal interaction, and accomplished the task with an interesting flair, than this trio of authors. The book's success derives from the insightful focus on the Gulf War's air leadership and the process it followed to control the air war.... This is one of the best Gulf War books becuase it explains where leadership lay in that conflict and, with that insight, encourages us to reexamine past wars....a must for those who lead air forces or work with them in the joint arenea."-Air Power History "[A] major contribution to the command and control literature. Put simply, the authors have written the most exhaustive examination of the Gulf war air command and control experience yet published, going beyond the detail to analyze what it means. The authors' primary interest was to examine how chaos in planning and directing operations was managed--particularly by an Air Force leadership in-theater that was skeptical of the quality of their command and control support and believed in putting their highly personal stamp on problem solving.... The conclusions of the analysis offer aphorisms that future air planners and JFACCs probably know already but need to keep in mind. . . The critique of scripted air power application is the best that this reviewer has seen. . . . This book should be on the shelf of any current or aspiring JFACC. It tells us what must be fixed and what must be avoided when we next enter combat, particularly if we face an enemy more capable than Saddam Hussein."-Naval War College Review