Failure by Design: The California Energy Crisis and the Limits of Market Planning

A new framework for studying markets as the product of organizational planning and understanding the practical limits of market design.   The Western energy crisis was one of the great financial disasters of the past century. The crisis began in April 2000, when price spikes started to rattle California’s electricity markets. Decades later, some blame economic fundamentals and ignorant politicians, while others accuse the energy sellers who raided the markets. In Failure by Design, sociologist Georg Rilinger offers a different explanation, one that focuses on the practical challenges of market design. The unique physical attributes of electricity made it exceedingly difficult to introduce markets into the coordination of the electricity system, so market designers were brought in to construct the infrastructures that coordinate how market participants interact. An exercise in social engineering, these infrastructures were intended to guide market actors toward behavior that would produce optimal market results and facilitate grid management. Yet, though these experts spent their days worrying about incentive misalignment and market manipulation, they unintentionally created a system riddled with opportunities for destructive behavior. Rilinger’s analysis not only illuminates the California energy crisis but also develops a broader theoretical framework for thinking about markets as the products of organizational planning and the limits of social engineering, contributing broadly to sociological and economic thinking about the nature of markets.  

Table of Contents:
Introduction Part One: A Case of Market Design Failure Chapter One: Two Tales of a Crisis Chapter Two: A Framework to Study Market Design Chapter Three: Breaking Bad in California’s Energy Markets Chapter Four: A Structural Explanation of the Energy Crisis Part Two: Why the Design Process Failed Chapter Five: Politics, Politics! Chapter Six: The Perils of Modularization Chapter Seven: The Chameleonic Market Conclusion Acknowledgments Appendix A: Data and Methods Appendix B: Key to Archival Sources Notes References Index

About the Author :
Georg Rilinger is the Fred Kayne (1960) Career Development Assistant Professor of Entrepreneurship and Assistant Professor of Technological Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Strategic Management at the MIT Sloan School of Management in Massachusetts.  

Review :
"In this groundbreaking book, Rilinger reveals the complex dynamics of markets, organizations, and technological innovation that are behind the regulation of commerce in this digital age. A large literature exists on systemic failures, breakdowns, accidents, and mistakes as well as a literature on market failure and financial crises. However, Rilinger is the first to expose failure as a “failure by design.” He reveals market design as a novel multi-dimensional organizational form with its own structures, processes, and socio-technical-economic concepts. Further, the book goes beyond anything yet published in the now-burgeoning literature about infrastructure, algorithms, and platforms. Failure by Design is a significant achievement, a comprehensive, analytically wise, exciting work that sets a new direction for understanding organizations in a changing society." "Failure by Design stems from a brilliant observation: modern markets are less likely to emerge from spontaneous social processes than from the conscious but contradictory intentions of economists, engineers, and stakeholders. Sometimes these designs fail catastrophically, as in the California electricity market. This supremely elegant and deeply original book explains why, making it one of the most essential contributions to political economy to come out in decades." "This is a terrific book about a famous economic disaster. Failure by Design offers many lessons, and Rilinger takes full advantage studying the market design choices that helped produce California’s energy crisis. Rather than round up usual suspects like Enron, Rilinger studies the experts, administrators, politicians, regulators, and industry participants who remade energy infrastructure as a carefully designed market. Based on deep research, this book’s lively prose offers rich insights and sophisticated analysis. It is an intellectual pleasure to read." "This book may be useful for graduate energy policy classes covering the California electricity situation in detail." "Through effective prose, impressive explanations of extremely complex systems, and careful analysis of the discourses and decisions surrounding the California energy crisis, Rilinger develops a new framework for analyzing designer markets and uncovers the roots of the crisis."