Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia(Cass Military Studies)

Oil, diamonds, timber, food aid - just some of the suggestions put forward as explanations for African wars in the past decade. Another set of suggestions focuses on ethnic and clan considerations. These economic and ethnic or clan explanations contend that wars are specifically not fought by states for political interests with mainly conventional military means, as originally suggested by Carl von Clausewitz in the 19th century. This study shows how alternative social organizations to the state can be viewed as political actors using war as a political instrument.

Table of Contents:
Preface and Acknowledgements Table of Contents List of Maps List of Abbreviations Chapter 1. Clausewitz, the Nature of War and African Warfare War Non-trinitarian War Trinitarian War African War Hypotheses and Cases The Actors The Interests The Instruments Cases Chapter 2. Case Study I Liberia (1989-1997) Introduction Liberia a short overview The Protagonists Phase 1. 24 December 1989 - 29 November 1990 Phase 2. 15 October 1992 - 31 July 1993 Phase 3. Post July 1993 Observations on the Dynamics of the Liberian Conflict Chapter 3. Case Study II Somalia (1988-1995) Introduction, Somalia a short overview The Protagonists Phase 1. 27 May 1988 - 27 January 1991 Phase 2. 28 January 1991 - 3 March 1992 Phase 3. 9 December 1992 - 28 March 1995 Observations on the Dynamics of the Somali Conflict Chapter 4. Political Actors Introduction A Political System Power Legitimacy Authority Rule A Political Actor and Trinitarian War Concluding Remarks Chapter 5. Political Interests Introduction Political Interests Political Rule Resource Interests Ethnic and Clan Interests Concluding Remarks Chapter 6. Political Instruments and Conventional War Introduction Centre of Gravity Distinction between Combatants and Non-Combatants Number of Recruits Conventional War Concluding Remarks Chapter 7. Politics and Strategy in African Wars; Intervention Dilemmas References Findings Implications Political Dilemmas Military Dilemmas Concluding Remarks

About the Author :
Isabelle Duyvesteyn is a lecturer at the Department of History of International Relations at the Institute of History, Utrecht University, The Netherlands. Previously she held appointments at the Royal Military Academy in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Institute for International Relations. Her research interests include civil war, Africa and humanitarian intervention. Her most recent publications have been with the Swedish National Defence College, in Security Studies and several Dutch language journals.