The Structure of Pluralism: (Oxford Constitutional Theory)

Pluralism proceeds from the observation that many associations in liberal democracies claim to possess, and attempt to exercise, a measure of legitimate authority over their members. They assert that this authority does not derive from the magnanimity of a liberal and tolerant state but is grounded, rather, on the common practices and aspirations of those individuals who choose to take part in a common endeavor. As an account of the authority of associations, pluralism is distinct from other attempts to accommodate groups like multiculturalism, subsidiarity, corporatism, and associational democracy. It is consistent with the explanation of legal authority proposed by contemporary legal positivists, and recommends that the formal normative systems of highly organized groups be accorded the status of fully legal norms when they encounter the laws of the state. In this book, Muniz-Fraticelli argues that political pluralism is a convincing political tradition that makes distinctive and radical claims regarding the sources of political authority and the relationship between associations and the state. Drawing on the intellectual tradition of the British political pluralists, as well as recent developments in legal philosophy and social ontology, the book argues that political pluralism makes distinctive and radical claims regarding the sources of political authority and the relationship between associations and the state.

Table of Contents:
Preface Part One: The distinctiveness of pluralism 1: The Structure of Pluralist Arguments 2: The Inadequacy of Multiculturalism 3: The Incompatibility of Subsidiarity 4: Associative Democracy and the Corporatist Temptation Part Two: The Constitutional Theory of Pluralism 5: Positive Pluralism 6: The Problem of Pluralist Autonomy 7: Law as Intelligibility 8: Pluralist Authority Part Three: The Personality of Associations 9: This Unity of Life and Action 10: The Personality of Associations 11: Property, Personality, and Public Justification Conclusion 12: The Specter of Intractability

About the Author :
Víctor M. Muñiz-Fraticelli is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Faculty of Law at McGill University. He holds a degree in law from the University of Puerto Rico and a PhD in political science from the University of Chicago. He works on political and legal pluralism, church and state relations, the philosophy of law, and contemporary theories of justice.