Social Dynamics

Brian Skyrms presents eighteen essays which apply adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory. Altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling are treated from this perspective. Correlation is seen to be of fundamental importance. Interactions with neighbors in space, on static networks, and on co-evolving dynamics networks are investigated. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.

Table of Contents:
Introduction Part I: Correlation and the Social Contract Introduction to part I 1: Evolution and the Social Contract Part II: Importance of Dynamics Introduction to part II 2: Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract 3: with Jason Alexander: Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? 4: Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models 5: Dynamics of Conformist Bias 6: Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics 7: with Jorge Pacheco, Francisco Santos and Max Souza: Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-person Stag Hunt Dilemmas 8: with Peter Vanderschraaf: Learning to Take Turns 9: with Kevin Zollman: Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms Part III: Dynamic Networks Introduction to part III 10: with Robin Pemantle: Learning to Network 11: with Robin Pemantle: A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation 12: with Robin Pemantle: Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run 13: with Robin Pemantle: Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models Part IV: Dynamics of Signals Introduction to part IV 14: with Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle and Stanislav Volkov: Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model 15: with Jason McKenzie Alexander and Sandy L. Zabell: Inventing New Signals 16: Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information 17: with Francesco Santos and Jorge Pacheco: Co-Evolution of Pre-Play Signaling and Cooperation 18: Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers Index

About the Author :
Brian Skyrms is Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and Economics at the University of California, Irvine. His interests cover a range of topics, including the evolution of conventions, the social contract, inductive logic, decision theory, rational deliberation, the metaphysics of logical atomism, causality, and truth. He is the author of Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (OUP, 2010) and From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity. Coherence, and Induction (OUP, 2012).

Review :
The book collects important contributions of a leading scientist in evolutionary game theory and drives us to study correlation devices further as possible solutions for the problems of human cooperation and of the social contract with analytical and simulation tools. It is rewarding and exemplifies a good way of doing formal philosophy. It sheds light on what evolutionary approaches, especially simulations, can and cannot do for philosophy. But mostly, it highlights the fact that our understanding of social phenomena cannot be complete if we neglect a dynamical point of view ... We may not need only books like this in philosophy; but we need some, and we certainly need more of them. And if the recent literature is any indication, we will have them -- in no small part due to Skyrms' remarkable, pioneering work Social Dynamics offers a careful, informed exploration of the relevant ones, as well as discussions of their explanatory import. No one interested in the evolution of sociality should ignore it, if only to know what it takes to carry out a thorough evolutionary investigation.