Coalitions and Compliance: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Latin America

Coalitions and Compliance examines how international changes can reconfigure domestic politics. Since the late 1980s, developing countries have been subject to intense pressures regarding intellectual property rights. These pressures have been exceptionally controversial in the area of pharmaceuticals. Historically, fearing the economic and social costs of providing private property rights over knowledge, developing countries did not allow drugs to be patented. Now they must do so, an obligation with significant implications for industrial development and public health. This book analyses different forms of compliance with this new imperative in Latin America, comparing the politics of pharmaceutical patenting in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Coalitions and Compliance focuses on two periods of patent politics: initial conflicts over how to introduce drug patents, and then subsequent conflicts over how these new patent systems function. In contrast to explanations of national policy choice based on external pressures, domestic institutions, or Presidents' ideological orientations, this book attributes cross-national and longitudinal variation to the ways that changing social structures constrain or enable political leaders' strategies to construct and sustain supportive coalitions. The analysis begins with assessment of the relative resources and capabilities of the transnational and national pharmaceutical sectors, and these rival actors' efforts to attract allies. Emphasis is placed on two ways that social structures are transformed so as to affect coalition-building possibilities: how exporters fearing the loss of preferential market access may be converted into allies of transnational drug firms, and differential patterns of adjustment among state and societal actors that are inspired by the introduction of new policies. It is within the changing structural conditions produced by these two processes that political leaders build coalitions in support of different forms of compliance.

Table of Contents:
Part I: Context, Theory, Explanatory Framework 1: Global Change, Political Coalitions, and National Responses 2: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents Part II: Introducing Pharmaceutical Patents 3: Power to the Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional Expansion, and Minimalist Compliance in Argentina 4: Not If but How: NAFTA and Extreme Over-Compliance in Mexico 5: Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, and Executive Agency: From Reluctant Acquiescence to Enthusiastic Over-Compliance in Brazil Part III: Modifying New Pharmaceutical Patent Systems 6: The Defensive Coalition on the Offensive: National Industry and Argentina's Market-Preserving Patent System 7: What's Good for Us is Good for You: The Transnational Pharmaceutical Sector and Mexico's Internationalist Patent System 8: Patent Policy in the Shadows of Over-Compliance: Neo-Developmentalism in Brazil Part IV: Conclusion 9: Patents and Development in the New Global Economy Fieldwork Appendix

About the Author :
Ken Shadlen is Professor of Development Studies in the Department of International Development, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His previous books include Democratization Without Representation (Penn State University, 2004), The Political Economy of Hemispheric Integration (co-edited with Diego Sanchez-Ancochea; Palgrave, 2008), The Politics of Intellectual Property (co-edited with Sebastian Haunss; Edward Elgar, 2009), and Intellectual Property, Pharmaceuticals and Public Health (co-edited with Samira Guennif, Alenka Guzmán, and Narayanan Lalitha; Edward Elgar 2011).

Review :
Shadlen masterfully uses comparative-historical analysis to explain countries' different reactions to external pressures regarding intellectual property rights. Drawing on substantial original research, he systematically compares a market-preserving patent regime in Argentina, a neo-developmental patent regime in Brazil, and an internationalist patent regime in Mexico. The argument is a triumphant theoretical and substantive success, formulating and applying a convincing analytical framework for understanding diversity in national responses to the new global order in intellectual property rights. Ken Shadlen's fascinating new book unveils the complexities of the international regime for intellectual property rights and the sea change it has undergone. Deftly combining international and comparative political economy, Coalitions and Compliance shows how contention over drug patents activates varying coalitions among international agencies, government regulators, health care stakeholders, and national and multinational pharmaceutical companies. This agenda-setting book contributes both to theory building and to lessons for developing countries that are attempting simultaneously to build health care systems, promote the knowledge economy, and comply with evolving global rules for protecting intellectual property. Situated at the intersection of international and comparative political economy, Coalitions and Compliance highlights the ways in which external shocks reshape domestic politics. Shadlen offers systematic comparative and longitudinal analyses of national approaches to implementing intellectual property rights in the pharmaceutical sector, underscoring the ways in which social structure affects political strategy and coalition building. The book's persuasive and fresh interventions provide important insights for analysts of global governance, political economy and global business regulation.