Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice

Thomas Carson offers the most comprehensive and up-to-date investigation of moral and conceptual questions about lying and deception. Part I addresses conceptual questions and offers definitions of lying, deception, and related concepts such as withholding information, "keeping someone in the dark," and "half truths." Part II deals with questions in ethical theory. Carson argues that standard debates about lying and deception between act-utilitarians and their critics are inconclusive because they rest on appeals to disputed moral intuitions. He defends a version of the golden rule and a theory of moral reasoning. His theory implies that there is a moral presumption against lying and deception that causes harm -- a presumption at least as strong as that endorsed by act-utilitarianism. He uses this theory to justify his claims about the issues he addresses in Part III: deception and withholding information in sales, deception in advertising, bluffing in negotiations, the duties of professionals to inform clients, lying and deception by leaders as a pretext for fighting wars (with special attention to the case of Bush and Cheney), and lying and deception about history (with special attention to the Holocaust), and cases of distorting the historical record by telling half-truths. The book concludes with a qualified defence of the view that honesty is a virtue.

Table of Contents:
Introduction and Précis PART I: CONCEPTS 1: Lying Introduction 1.1 My Definition of Lying 1.I.1: Lies and Falsehoods 1.I.2: Falsehoods and Lies 1.I.3: A Reformulation of the Dictionary Definitions 1.I.4: Lying and the Right to Know the Truth 1.I.5: That the Intent to Deceive is not Necessary for Lying 1.I.6: Chisholm and Feehan's Definition 1.I.7: My Definition of Lying (A Preliminary Version) 1.I.8: "A Defence of the Transparency Thesis" 1.I.9: The Concept of Warranting 1.I.10: Conditions for Warranting the Truth of a Statement 1.I.11: Yet Another Revision 1.I.12: A Complication of My Final Definition 1.I.13: Some Comments on this Definition 1.I.14: An Objection: The Concept of Assertion Fried Williams Chisholm and Feehan 1.I.15: Reasons to Accept my Definition 1.II Replies to Criticisms of My Definition 1.II.1: Sorensen 1.II.2: Fallis Conclusions Endnotes 2. Deception and Related Concepts Introduction 2.I Deception 2.I.2: Several Objections and Modified Versions of My Definition 2.I.3: Some Considerations Relevant to Later Parts of the Book 2.II Keeping Someone in the Dark 2.III The Relationship between Lying, Deception, Keeping Someone in the Dark, Concealing Information, and Withholding Information 2.III.1: The Difference between Lying and Deception 2.III.2: Deception Versus Witholding Information 2.III.3: Concealing Information, Withholding Information, and Deception 2.IV Two Related Notions: "Spin" and "Half-Truths" 2.V Bullshit 2.V.1: Frankfurt on Bullshit, Deception, and Lying 2.V.2: Bullshit and Lack of Concern with the Truth 2.V.3: Bullshit Does Not Require the Intention to Deceive 2.V.4: Lying Can Constitute Producing Bullshit 2.V.5: Bullshitters Can be Concerned with the Truth of What they Say 2.VI A Very Brief Note on Honesty Endnotes PART II: MORAL THEORY IIA NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY 3. Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying Introduction 3.I Kant's Categorical Imperative 3.I.1: The Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative 3.I.2: Perfect and Imperfect Duties 3.I.3: The Second and Third Versions of the Categorical Imperative 3.II What Kant Says about the Morality of Lying 3.II.1: The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) 3.II.2: Metaphysics of Morals (1797) 3.II.3: "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Concerns" 3.II.4: Allan Wood's Alternative Reading of "On a Supposed Right..." 3.II.5: Lectures on Ethics 3.III Does the First Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is Always Wrong? 3.IV Does the Second Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is Always Wrong? 3.V A Rossian Argument for Thinking that Lying is Sometimes Morally Permissable Conclusions Endnotes 4. Act-Utilitarianism Introduction 4.I The Definition of (Act) Utilitarianism Act and Rule Utilitarianism/Consequentialism 4.II Guide to Action Versus Criterion of Right and Wrong 4.III The Implications of Act-Utilitarianism for Issues of Lying and Deception Direct Bad Consequences of Lying and Deception Conclusions and Transition to Chapter 5 Endnotes 5. Ross and Rule-Consequentialism Introduction 5.I Ross's Theory 5.I.1: The Concept of Prima Facie Duty 5.I.2: Ross's List of Prima Facie Duties 5.I.3: Applying Ross's Theory to Cases 5.I.4: How Strong is the Moral Presumption against Lying? 5.II Ross's Criticisms of Act-Utilitarianism 5.II.1: Ross and Utilitarianism on Promise Keeping 5.II.2: Ross's Arguments about Promise-Keeping Modified to Apply to Cases of Lying 5.III Ross on the Basis of Our Knowledge of Fundamental Moral Principles 5.III.1: Self-Evidence 5.III.2: The Data of Ethics 5.IV Criticisms of Ross's View about the Basis of Moral Knowledge 5.IV.1: Self-Evident Knowledge 5.IV.2: The Moral Convictions of Thoughtful and Well-Educated People 5.IV.3: A Possible Reply for Ross 5.IV.4: Two Other Possible Lines for Ross to Take 5.V Hooker's Rule-Consequentialism 5.V.1: Hooker's Theory 5.V.2: Hooker's Arguments for Rule Consequentialism 5.V.3: Problems with Hooker's Arguments 5.VI Conclusions to Chapters 3-5 and Transition to Chapter 6 Endnotes IIB MORAL REASONING 6. The Golden Rule and a Theory of Moral Reasoning Introduction 6.I Rationality Conditions for Moral Judgements and Moral Judges 6.I.1: Consistency 6.I.2: Being Adequately Informed 6.I.3: Proper Cognitive Functioning 6.II The Golden Rule 6.II.1: Proof of the Golden Rule 6.II.2: Defense of Premises 1, 1a, 1b, and 1c 6.II.3: Defense of Premises 2, 2a, 2b, and 2c 6.III The Force of Golden Rule Arguments An Example 6.IV Objections to the Golden Rule 6.IV.1: When are Differences Morally Relevant? 6.IV.2: Masochists and People with Unusual Preferences 6.IV.3: Punishing People and Doing Things that they Do Not Want One to Do 6.IV.4: People who are Depressed and Do Not Care what Happens to them 6.V Applications: Rational Consistent Moral Judges Will All Agree in their Judgements about Certain Issues 6.V.1: Nazis 6.V.2: Fraud 6.V.3: Another Case of Fraud 6.V.4: Ethical Egoism 6.VI Why be Consistent? Question 1 Question 2 An Objection 6.VII Moral Nihilism/Amoralism (Opting out of Moral Discourse) 6.VII.1: Consistency Arguments Only Apply to People Who Make Moral Judgements 6.VII.2: Reasons to Accept Morality 6.VII.3: A Reservation 6.VIII A Note on R. M. Hare 6.IX Limitations/Caveats Endnotes IIC THE IMPLICATIONS OF IIA AND IIB FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT LYING AND DECEPTION 7. The Partial Overlap/Convergence of Reasonable Views Introduction 7.I What Rationality/Consistency Tests can and cannot Show An Objection 7.II Absolutism 7.III Reflective Equilibrium 7.IV The Implications of these Results for the Rest of the Book Endnotes PART III: APPLICATIONS 8. Deception and Withholding Information on Sales Introduction Caveat Emptor 8.I The Obligations of Salespeople 8.I.1: My View 8.I.2: A Justification for My View A Qualification An Objection Reply The Justification of Duties 5 and 6 8.II Case Studies 8.II.1: Deception in Sales Case 1:: The Sales Tactics of the Holland Furnace Company Case 2:: Falsifying an Odometer Case 3:: College Admissions Case 4:: Shoe Sales What about Cases in Which a Person Benefits by Being Deceived? Case 5:: Paternalistic Deception 8.II.2: WithHolding Information in Sales Case 1:: Health Insurance Case 2:: Steering Customers Case 3:: Withholding Information about Defects Endnotes 9. Deception in Advertising Introduction 9.I Deceptive Advertising 9.I.1: The Harmfulness of Deceptive Advertising: Case Studies Sears Dishwasher Listerine Vioxx R. J. Reynolds 9.I.2: The Wrongness of Deceptive Advertising 9.II Why Following the Law is not Enough 9.II.1: The FTC's Definition of Deceptive Advertising 9.II.2: Why it's not Enough to Follow the Law 9.III Two Objections 9.III.1: Cases of Small Harms to Many People 9.III.2: What if Being Honest gives Dishonest Competitors an Advantage? Endnotes 10. Bluffing and Deception in Negotiations Introduction 10.I What is Bluffing? 10.II The Economics of Bluffing 10.III Is it Morally Permissible to Misstate One's Negotiating Position? An Objection 10.IV Applying the Principle of Self-Defense An Objection Replies A Related Objection Endnotes 11. Honesty, Professionals, and the Vulnerability of the Public Introduction 11.I The Frequent Incentive/Temptation to Deceive Clients 11.II Information Disclosure and Professional Obligations 11.III Informed Consent Exceptions Endnotes 12. Lying and Deception about Questions of War and Peace: Case Studies Introduction 12.I Lying and Deception in Order to Create a Justification or Pretext for War 12.I.1: Hearst and the Spanish American War 12.I.2: Franklin Roosevelt and World War II 12.I.3: Lyndon Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 12.II Another Case: George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and the Iraq War of 2003 12.II.1: Claims About Iraq's "Weapons of Mass-Destruction" 12.II.2: Claims About the Connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda 12.II.3: The Falsity of Claims about Iraq's Weapons and its Connections with Al Qaeda 12.II.4: Reasons to Think that Some of the Claims about Iraq's Weapons and Ties to Al Qaeda Constituted Lying or (Attempted) Deception 12.II.5: Lying and Deception about Other Matters Related to the Iraq War 12.III A Case of Lying/Deception to Avoid War? 12.IV A Moral Assessment of (Some of) the Cases 12.IV.1: Lyndon Johnson 12.IV.2: Bush and Cheney 12.IV.3: Over-optimism as a Major Cause of Wars 12.IV.4: Franklin Roosevelt 12.IV.5: Acheson, Dulles, and Eisenhower Endnotes 13. Honesty, Conflicts, and the Telling of History: More Case Studies Introduction 13.I Germany, World War I, and the Myth of the "Stab in the Back" American Versions of the Dolchstosslegenge? 13.II Rewriting History 13.II.1: Feel-Good Confederate History and the Post-Civil War South 13.II.2: Lying About the Crimes of Joseph Stalin 13.II.3: An Objection 13.III Half-Truths and Group Conflict 13.III.1: Half-Truths 13.III.2: Examples of Harmful Half-Truths The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict The US and Iran Hitler and Germany's Suffering after WWI 13.III.3: Half-Truths in Personal Relations 13.IV Intellectual Honesty Endnotes 14. Honesty as a Virtue Introduction 14.I Dissenters from Conventional Wisdom 14.I.1: Lying, Deception, and Privacy 14.I.2: Lying, Honesty, and Interpersonal Conflicts 14.I.3: Lying, Deception, and Self-Esteem 14.II In What Sense Honesty is and is not a Virtue Endnotes Bibliography Index

About the Author :
Thomas L. Carson is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. He is the author of two books, Value and the Good Life (University of Notre Dame Press) and The Status of Morality (D.Reidel), and is the co-editor of Morality and the Good Life (OUP) and Moral Relativism (OUP).

Review :
"I think that Carson'sanalysis comes very close to capturing the normative element of lying ... Carson has produced an excellent work that combines conceptual analysis, moral theory, and applied philosophy. Anyone interested in lying and deception from any of these philosophical perspectives should read this book. Moreover, Carson is right to emphasize the conceptual and moral importance of warranting the truth of what you do not believe." - Don Fallis, Mind"The book is well organized and carefully and subtly argued. Carson is grounded in both philosophical scholarship and intellectual history. The book moves from theory to application and opens areas of applied ethics not often discussed... the book is also rich with stories and examples and in some places it soars as with the discussion of the Iraq war. Lying and Deception deserves to be widely read as Carson has threaded years of scholarship on this topic into a rich and coherent account. Two thumbs up!" - Norman Bowie, Business Ethics Quarterly"I cannot here do justice to Carson's defense of the Golden Rule... nor to his application of his definitions and moral arguments to the range of issues considered in the final chapters... This book is important insofar as it is a lengthy treatment of a topic that is too often relegated to parts of books or articles. Thankfully, this situation is changing, and Carson has done much to bring about this change." - James Mahon, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews"Carson makes the strong case that honesty in the negative sense is a virtue in ordinary circumstances, while in the positive sense it often is not... Anyone with a philosophical interest in the concept of lying will find Carson's book rewarding, and it is necessary reading for those interested in the subtle distinctions between lying and its related terms." - Eleni Kaklamanou, Journal of Applied Philosophy