Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy

Some philosophers think physical explanations stand on their own: what happens, happens because things have the properties they do. Others think that any such explanation is incomplete: what happens in the physical world must be partly due to the laws of nature. Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy examines the debate between these views from Descartes to Hume. Ott argues that the competing models of causation in the period grow out of the scholastic notion of power. On this Aristotelian view, the connection between cause and effect is logically necessary. Causes are 'intrinsically directed' at what they produce. But when the Aristotelian view is faced with the challenge of mechanism, the core notion of a power splits into two distinct models, each of which persists throughout the early modern period. It is only when seen in this light that the key arguments of the period can reveal their true virtues and flaws. To make his case, Ott explores such central topics as intentionality, the varieties of necessity, and the nature of relations. Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser-known writers such as Pierre-Sylvain Régis, Nicolas Malebranche, and Robert Boyle.

Table of Contents:
Introduction Part I: The Cartesian predicament 1: What mechanism isn't 2: The rejection of Aristotelianism 3: The nude wax: Cartesian ontology 4: The laws of nature 5: Force 6: Occasionalism Part II: The dialectic of occasionalism 7: Malebranche and the cognitive model of causation 8: Laws and divine volitions 9: Causation and explanation 10: A scholastic mechanism 11: Régis against the occasionalists Part III: Power and necessity 12: 'A dead cadaverous thing' 13: Relations and powers 14: Boyle's paradox 15: Boyle and the concurrentists 16: Locke on relations 17: Locke on powers: The geometrical model 18: Locke's mechanisms 19: Conclusion Part IV: Hume 20: The Two Humes 21: Intentionality 22: Necessity 23: Relations 24: The definition of causation 25: Conclusion

About the Author :
Walter Ott holds a Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. He is the author of Locke's Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press, 2004) and is currently assistant professor of philosophy at Virginia Tech.

Review :
Walter Ott offers us a fascinating account of the development of theories of causation and laws of nature in the early modern period... a great piece of scholarship covering an impressive array of figures. It is quite a demanding read, but well worth the effort. I find the book truly illuminating, rich and intriguing. It is clearly an important contribution to the literature on early modern metaphysics and natural philosophy. Causation and Laws of Nature combines philosophical acumen and historical care to offer a fresh perspective on early modern views of causation, intentionality, power, necessity, and laws of nature. Cutting a path from Aquinas and Suarez through Descartes and the occasionalists to Hume, Ott explores tensions and problems central to the development of early modern philosophy. There is much to learn here about the history of philosophy and some of its most important figures. Walter Ott offers an especially clear narrative concerning the development of the notions of causation and causal laws during the period bounded by Descartes and Hume. This narrative usefully distinguishes bottom-up approaches that take causation to be grounded in the properties of physical objects from top-down approaches that take causal laws to provide a contribution to causation in the physical world that cannot be reduced to the contribution of such properties. A distinctive feature of Otts discussion is its use of the views of Régis and Locke to illustrate the nature of bottom-up accounts of causation in the early modern period. Various aspects of Otts interpretations both of these figures and of Descartes, Malebranche, Boyle and Hume are controversial but merit the further consideration they no doubt will receive.