Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals

Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the dormant alternative theory of resemblance nominalism, showing first that it can withstand the attacks of such eminent opponents as Goodman and Armstrong, and then that there are reasons to prefer it to its rival theories. The clarity and rigour of his arguments will challenge metaphysicians to rethink their views on properties.

Table of Contents:
Introduction 1: The Problem of Universals: A Problem about Truthmakers 2: The Explananda of the Problems of Universals 3: The Many over One 4: Resemblance Nominalism 5: The Coextension Difficulty 6: Russell's Regress 7: The Resemblance Structure of Property Classes 8: Goodman's Difficulties 9: The Imperfect Community Difficulty 10: The Companionship Difficulty 11: The Mere Intersections Difficulty 12: The Superiority of Resemblance Nominalism Appendix: On Imperfect Communities and the Non-communities they Entail References, Index

About the Author :
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra is Fellow and Tutor of Philosophy at Hertford College, Oxford.

Review :
Rodriguez-Pereyra ... develops a novel understanding of the problem of universals, offers his own conception of truthmaking and examines the relative virtues of qualitative and quantitative economy... [he] deserves praise for following arguments where they lead and challenging so many of the ingrained assumptions that metaphysicians routinely bring to bear upon the discussion of resemblance nominalism. Fraser MacBride, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Dan Dennett's Philosophical Lexicon contains the entry: 'Exhume, v. to revive a position generally thought to be humed.' This book is the most brilliant philosophical exhumation that it has been my pleasure to encounter. This book argues that our attributions of properties and relations can be given satisfactory truthmakers using no more than resemblances holding between ordinary particulars. Many of us had assumed that this program is bankrupt, but now we must think again ... With patient and ingenious argument [Rodriguez-Pereyra] has shown that the theory has more to be said for it than ever I, and I suspect many others, had imagined. The fundamental nature of properties and relations may be the central question in metaphysics. He has made an important contribution to the topic. D. M. Armstrong, Australasian Journal of Philosophy