About the Book
Joseph Raz (1939–2022) was a towering figure in late 20th century and early 21st century analytical philosophy. His work in moral, political, and legal philosophy profoundly influenced the discipline, informing debates about practical reasoning, value theory, foundations of liberalism, personal autonomy, perfectionism, the nature of authority, theories of rights, free expression, multiculturalism, the nature of promises, the rule of law, toleration and pluralism, and the nature of law, among others. This collection—the product of two highly selective, international conferences held in Raz's honour soon after his passing—pays tribute to Raz's enormous influence in moral, political, and legal philosophy. The collected essays all engage with Raz's work, but not necessarily as critiques or interpretations of his work. The collection is a testament to Raz's impact, direct and indirect, on a wide range of philosophical issues and on a large and diverse set of philosophical communities. The overarching themes tackled in the collection include: 1. Normativity and Values, 2. Practical Reasoning, 3. Agency and Autonomy, 4. Rights and Obligations, 5. The Public Domain, and 6. Authority. Contributors include both leading figures and rising stars.
Table of Contents:
Part I. Normativity and Values
1: T. M. Scanlon: Understanding Good of a Kind and Good For in Terms of Reasons
2: Claire Kirwin: The Guise of the Good and the Agential Perspective on Action
3: Debbie Roberts: The Irrelevance of Supervenience
4: Ralph Wedgwood: Decision-Theoretic Virtue Ethics
Part II. Practical Reasoning
5: Jason Bridges: "Rational Explanation" and the Logic of Practical Reasons
6: Ulrike Heuer: The Point of Exclusionary Reasons
7: Michael S. Moore: Requiem for a Concept: Exclusionary Reasons
8: Massimo Renzo: Motivation and Alienation
Part III. Agency and Autonomy
9: John Hyman: Intentional Action and the Special Question "Why?"
10: Elinor Mason: Being in the World: Self-Conception and Taking Responsibility
11: David Enoch: Revisiting Raz on Autonomy
12: Steven Wall: Autonomy and Options
Part IV. Rights and Obligations
13: Kimberley Brownlee: The Razian's Elephant in the Room: When Do Interests Give Rise to Rights?
14: Thomas Christiano: Normative Conventionalism about Contracts
15: Filippa Ronquist: Conventionalism and the Wrong of Promise-Breaking
Part V. The Public Domain
16: Emad H. Atiq: Law, the Rule of Law, and Goodness-Fixing Kinds
17: Brian H. Bix: What Does Law Claim?
18: Daniel Weinstock: Rethinking Multiculturalism with (and against) Raz
Part VI. Authority
19: David Owens: Command and Obedience
20: Andrei Marmor: Authority, Legitimacy, and Accountability
21: Daniel Viehoff: Service and the Moral Problem(s) of Authority
About the Author :
Andrei Marmor is the Jacob Gould Schurman Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law at Cornell University. Prior to joining Cornell in 2015, he was Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law at the University of Southern California. His research interests span philosophy of law, moral, social and political philosophy, and philosophy of language. Marmor published seven monographs with Oxford and Princeton university presses, and a number of
edited volumes. His books and articles also appeared in numerous translations, including in Chinese, Spanish, Portuguese, Romanian, Turkish, Farsi, Hebrew, Japanese, Korean, and Italian. Kimberley Brownlee holds the
Canada Research Chair in Ethics and Political & Social Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. She received her DPhil from Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar). She is a Commonwealth Scholar and Fulbright Research Chair. Her current work focuses on loneliness, belonging, social human rights, and freedom of association. Her other work focuses on conscience, civil disobedience, punishment, and restorative justice. She is the author of Being Sure of Each Other (OUP, 2020)
and Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience (OUP, 2012). She is the co-editor of Being Social: The Philosophy of Social Human Rights (OUP, 2022), The Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy (2016)
and Disability and Disadvantage (OUP, 2009). David Enoch studied law and philosophy at Tel Aviv University, and received his PhD in philosophy at NYU in 2003. He's been a professor at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, on a joint appointment in law and philosophy, ever since. Recently, he started as the Professor of the Philosophy of Law at Oxford. He works primarily in moral, political, and legal philosophy.
