Reasons First

In the last five decades, ethical theory has been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons is so useful precisely because reasons have analytical and explanatory priority over other normative concepts—that reasons in that sense come first. Reasons First systematically explores both the benefits and burdens of the hypothesis that reasons do indeed come first in normative theory, against the conjecture that theorizing in both ethics and epistemology can only be hampered by neglect of the other. Bringing two decades of work on reasons in both ethics and epistemology to bear, Mark Schroeder argues that some of the most important challenges to the idea that reasons could come first are themselves the source of some of the most obstinate puzzles in epistemology: about how perceptual experience could provide evidence about the world, and about what can make evidence sufficient to justify belief. Schroeder shows that, along with moral worth, one of the very best cases for the fundamental explanatory power of reasons in normative theory actually comes from knowledge.

About the Author :
Mark Schroeder is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. His research ranges widely in ethics, epistemology, and related areas, and his work has appeared in over two dozen journals. He is the author of Slaves of the Passions (OUP, 2007), Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism (OUP, 2008), Noncognitivism in Ethics (Routledge, 2010), Explaining the Reasons We Share (OUP, 2014), and Expressing Our Attitudes (OUP, 2015).

Review :
Mark Schroeder develops a compelling version of reasons first epistemology, showing that epistemology has much to gain from adopting it superlative and ambitious . . . There is much in the book that I have not thus far commented on, and much that I have only given the barest attention. This is sadly unavoidable given the sheer number of interesting and insightful arguments and theses that Schroeder propounds and discusses. My advice is to read the book. Mark Schroeder provides the best account yet of a reasons first approach to normativity in general. He successfully demonstrates that by paying close attention to the study of reasons in ethics, epistemologists can improve their understanding of the nature of epistemic reasons, rationality, and knowledge. This is a carefully argued and well-structured book that will be an enjoyable, illuminating read for both students and experts. Reasons First pursues a bold and systematic program of a kind rare in contemporary philosophy: to use the notion of a reason—not ought or good—as the bedrock of normative theorizing. Schroeder demonstrates the surprising fruitfulness of this program for epistemology. Marshalling a general theory of reasons, together with an independently plausible account of belief, he elegantly explains a broad range of facts about epistemic rationality, including its puzzling sensitivity to the availability of further evidence and the costs of error. The book is a major event for philosophy generally and for epistemology in particular. Schroeder presents an ambitious, important innovation in epistemology, an innovation he describes as "the core hypothesis." Reasons First offers a comprehensive account of reasons and beliefs. Schroeder's penetrating arguments take lessons from the role of reasons in ethics to develop a sophisticated account of their relation to rationality, knowledge, and justification. Along the way, Schroeder develops many subtle distinctions and considerations. The book is a tour de force, written with Schroeder's characteristic skill and verve. It will be a significant resource for epistemologists for years to come. In his highly illuminating new book, Reasons First, Mark Schroeder shows us something of great importance. He takes the "Reasons First" program that has been so influential in ethics, and shows us what is the best way to extend this program from ethics to epistemology. This is important because if the Reasons First program is true at all, it should be true of epistemology as well as ethics