Self-Knowledge and Knowledge A Priori

How is it possible to know of one's own mental states for the most part effortlessly and authoritatively? How can we know substantive facts of logic and mathematics, applicable to the natural world, just by thinking? These basic questions concern kinds of knowledge--psychological self-knowledge and knowledge a priori--that, however different in their subject matters, both seem to exemplify a species of immediate, non-sensuous apprehension which resists assimilation to perception and, to that extent, integration within naturalistic accounts of knowledge at large. Self-Knowledge and Knowledge A Priori shows how the philosophical challenges we face in accounting for these two kinds of (presumptive) knowledge are strikingly similar. In each case, there is an initial problem of providing a satisfactory characterization of the target phenomenon; each has provoked a sweep of sceptical reactions, as well as a variety of (unsuccessful) attempts at constructive explanatory models; in each case there is argument that knowledge (or, at least, epistemically respectable judgement) of the kind in question is indispensable to rational inquiry, deliberation, and action. Written by seventeen leading researchers in contemporary analytic epistemology, this book builds on the Knowledge Beyond Natural Science project at the University of Stirling and fosters the dialogue between the philosophical problems of the priori and self-knowledge, while advancing novel contributions to each of the ongoing debates.

Table of Contents:
1: Giovanni Merlo, Giacomo Melis, and Crispin Wright: Self-Knowledge and Knowledge A Priori: Introduction Part I. Exceptionalism 2: Lucy Campbell: Knowing That One Is in Pain and 'Feeling That' One Is in Pain 3: Giovanni Merlo: Privileged Access Without Luminosity 4: Giacomo Melis: Brute Errors and Evidential Roles 5: Joshua C. Thurow: Understanding to the Rescue 6: Crispin Wright: The Knowledge Expressed by Phenomenal Avowals: A Straightforward View Part II. Scepticism 7: Claire Field: Being Wrong About Logic 8: Albert Casullo: The Epistemology of Essence: Three Issues 9: Alex Byrne: Knowing That I Am in Pain 10: Sophie Keeling: Inference and Transparency: A Two Explanations Account of Self-Knowledge Part III. Deflationism 11: Derek Ball: Knowing by Stipulation 12: Dorit Bar-On: 'I', My Self, and My Mental States 13: Annalisa Coliva and Edward Mark: Transparency Over-Extended Part IV. New Directions 14: Robert D. Rupert: Self-Knowledge in a Human Mind Flattened from Above 15: Christopher Peacocke: Objective Justification and Factive States 16: Marcus Giaquinto: Is Mathematics an A Priori Science? 17: Silvia De Toffoli: Mathematical Justification Without Proof

About the Author :
Giacomo Melis is Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Stirling. In 2021 he was awarded a UKRI Future Leader Fellowship to lead an interdisciplinary project on rationality at the University of Stirling and the Messerli Research Institute at the University of Vienna. Giovanni Merlo is Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Geneva, where he leads a five-year SNSF Starting Grant project entitled Metaphysics We Can Believe In. Crispin Wright is Professor of Philosophical Research at the University of Stirling. He has taught at Oxford, St Andrews, Aberdeen, Michigan, Princeton, Columbia, and New York.