Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that these judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that these properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory, but he argues that it is not. Instead, he argues, our inability to believe this error theory makes the theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory, and it undermines revisionary alternatives to the theory. Streumer then sketches how certain other philosophical views can be defended in a similar way, and how philosophers should modify their method if there can be true theories that we cannot believe. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we should sharply distinguish the truth of a theory from our ability to believe it

Table of Contents:
1: Normative Judgements and Properties 2: The Reduction Argument 3: Further Versions of the Reduction Argument 4: The False Guarantee and Regress Objections 5: Further Defences of Realism 6: The Symmetry Objection 7: Further Views 8: The Error Theory 9: Believing the Error Theory 10: Reason to Believe the Error Theory 11: Objections, Rejection, Revision 12: Effects, Parallels, Progress Conclusion Bibliography

About the Author :
Bart Streumer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. He previously taught at the University of Reading. His work has appeared in journals such as the Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Review :
Bart Streumer's Unbelievable Errors is an outstanding defense of the error theory - the theory that all normative judgments are false. It is exceptionally well written and thorough and breaks new ground in its argument that our inability to believe the error theory makes the theory more likely to be true. Those interested in the error theory and metanormative debate more generally cannot afford to miss this book. Bart Streumer's book, Unbelievable Errors, is jampacked with arguments and careful engagement with the philosophical literature at every turn. There is a great deal to be learned from it, both about its subject matter and about the philosophical virtues of both tenacity and care. Unbelievable Errors is an admirably clear, detailed, and powerful defence of a bold position. I recommend it highly. Unbelievable Errors as a whole is a fascinating and carefully executed attempt to settle a classic dispute in metaethics by embracing a radical theoretical package. ... It is just as rich in interesting arguments against opposing views as in those for the error theory and its unbelievability. Throughout, Streumer does an admirable job of combining clarity and conciseness. Bart Streumer's fine book ... is full of valuable insights. Streumer flips the incredulity that many of us are likely to experience in response to his arguments on its head. He argues that such incredulity is exactly what we should expect if his error theory were true. Philosophical gems like this move can be found throughout the book. It's bold stuff that will have philosophers talking. Bertrand Russell wrote that the point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to be worth stating only to end up with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it. In his aptly named Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer has produced an exemplary case of philosophy so described.