The Objects of Thought

The Objects of Thought addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. Tim Crane argues that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that we will not adequately understand thought's representational power ('intentionality') unless we have understood the representation of the non-existent. Intentionality is conceived by Crane in terms of the direction of the mind upon an object of thought, or an intentional object. Intentional objects are what we think about. Some intentional objects exist and some do not. Non-existence poses a problem because there seem to be truths about non-existent intentional objects, but truths are answerable to reality, and reality contains only what exists. The proposed solution is to accept that there are some genuine truths about non-existent intentional objects, but to hold that they must be reductively explained in terms of truths about what does exist. The Objects of Thought offers both an original account of the nature of intentionality and a solution to the problem of thought about the non-existent.

Table of Contents:
PART I: OBJECTS 1: The problem of nonexistence 2: Existence and quantification 3: The nature of existence and non-existence PART II: THOUGHT 4: The structure of intentionality 5: Reductionism and psychologism 6: Thinking about specific things Concluding remarks Bibliography Index

About the Author :
Tim Crane is Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, and a Professorial Fellow of Peterhouse College. He is the author of Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (OUP, 2001), and co-editor (with Katalin Farkas) of Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology (OUP, 2004). He is the philosophy editor of the Times Literary Supplement, and the general editor of the Routledge Encylopedia of Philosophy. Crane is also a member (by election) of the Academia Europaea, on the editorial board of Mind and Language, and a member of the Analysis committee.

Review :
`The Objects of Thought is a rich book, full of ideas and arguments. Making room for non-existent objects is a complicated business, and Crane covers a lot of ground very clearly. So this is a great book for anyone who wishes to get a sophisticated overview of the debate about non-existent objects. Because I have only been able to discuss a very small part of this complicated issue, my suggestion is to go out and read the book.' Analysis `Ambitious, ingenious, and lucid . . . Crane's excellent book . . . has all sorts of interesting and insightful things to say about metaphysics, language, and intentionality. There is a great deal to be learned about these things from The Objects of Thought, whether or not one ultimately agrees with the details of Crane's positive view. Crane also has a fluid clear style that makes his book a pleasure to read. So I recommend it very warmly, not merely to those interested in the nonexistent, but to all those interested in metaphysics and intentionality.' Anthony Everett, Mind `His discussion throughout is both delightfully clear and eminently sensible--a quality that is rarer than it should be in view of much recent metaphysical extravagance in analytic philosophy . . . Tim's Crane's account is, all told, of considerable merit, and can be recommended to anyone concerned with the nature of the mind.' Peter Simons, The Times Literary Supplement `ingenious, full of insight and wonderfully clearly written.' Niall Connolly, The Philosophical Quarterly `elegant and original.' Pierre Jacob, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews `Crane offers a solid contribution to the debate on the problem of intentional inexistence . . . Highly recommended.' CHOICE `a rich book, full of ideas and arguments . . . Crane covers a lot of ground very clearly. So this is a great book for anyone who wishes to get a sophisticated overview of the debate about non-existent objects. ' Michelle Montague, Analysis `I recommend it highly to those interested not only in the specific matters with which it deals, but also to philosophers of mind more generally.' Guy Longworth, Philosophy