Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law

Retrospective rule-making has few supporters and many opponents. Defenders of retrospective laws generally do so on the basis that they are a necessary evil in specific or limited circumstances, for example to close tax loopholes, to deal with terrorists or to prosecute fallen tyrants. Yet the reality of retrospective rule making is far more widespread than this, and ranges from 'corrective' legislation to 'interpretive regulations' to judicial decision making. The search for a rational justification for retrospective rule-making necessitates a reconsideration of the very nature of the rule of law and the kind of law that can rule, and will provide new insights into the nature of law and the parameters of societal order. This book examines the various ways in which laws may be seen as retrospective and analyses the problems in defining retrospectivity. In his analysis Dr Charles Sampford asserts that the definitive argument against retrospective rule-making is the expectation of individuals that, if their actions today are considered by a future court, the applicable law was discoverable at the time the action was performed. The book goes on to suggest that although the strength of this 'rule of law' argument should prevail in general, exceptions are sometimes necessary, and that there may even be occasions when analysis of the rule of law may provide the foundation for the application of retrospective laws.

Table of Contents:
1: Defining Retrospectivity 2: The Rule of Law 3: Arguments Against Retrospective Law 4: Retrospective Legislation 5: Retrospective Judicial Law-Making 6: Justifications for Retrospective Law 7: Conclusions and Consequences for the Rule of Law

About the Author :
After gaining a double first in politics and philosophy and the Supreme Court Prize in Law from Melbourne University, Charles Sampford won a Commonwealth Scholarship to Oxford to pursue his studies in legal philosophy being awarded a DPhil in 1984. He returned to Melbourne University to teach law before being a secondment to the Philosophy Department in 1990 to help establish the Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues. In 1991 he was invited to come to Queensland as Foundation Dean of Law at Griffith University. This is widely regarded as the most innovative and most successful of Australia's new law schools. In 1999, he was appointed Foundation Director of the Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance (one of only 14 such nationally funded centres across all disciplines and all disciplines). In 2004, he became Director of the Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, a joint initiative of the United Nations University and Griffith.

Review :
Anyone who desires to write or think about problems of legal retrospectivity or the rule of law must read and refer to this excellent book.