The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918

The popular image of the First World War is dominated by two misconceptions. The first holds that the war was an exercise in futility in which incompetent upper class generals callously sacrificed an entire generation of young men to no good purpose. The second holds that the debate about British strategic policy during the First World War was a gladiatorial contest between `brass hats' (generals), and `frock coats' (politicians). Historians, denied access for too long to the contemporary records of the private deliberations of policy-makers, had been forced to follow both interpretations. David French challenges this orthodoxy and suggests that the policy-makers were united in trying to relate strategic policy to a carefully considered set of war aims. His challenging conclusion is that the policy-makers never lost sight of their goal, which was to ensure that Britain fought the war at an acceptable cost and emerged from it with its security enhanced against both its enemies and its allies.

Review :
`French is a penetrating analysist and judicious in his assesments...valuable work... no one with a serious in the subject can afford to miss it.' The Times This is an excellent volume, thoroughly researched, which sets out in archival detail for the first time the evolution of British strategy during the last two years of the war. This book, together with his earlier volume is now the definitive account of British strategy in the First world war. `Readers will find this book a detailed study of high academic merit, meticulously researched and referenced, but what struck this reviewer from the outset was the extent to which the author has successfully evoked a very real sense of the dilemmas confronting British policy-makers ... this book provides a fascinating study of the problems of coalition warfare.' Ian Gooderson, King's College, London, Strategic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, Sept '96 `French's latest book is a worthy successor to his fine earlier study, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914-1916 (CH, Mar'87). Together the two volumes go a long way toward providing a more balanced and critically sympathetic account of the British policy-making elite's prosecution of WW I ... lucid and thoroughly researched book ... Readable and more comprehensive than its title implies, this book can be recommended for upper-division undergraduates and above.' F. Coetzee, George Washington University, Choice, March 1996 Vol. 33 No. 7 `This volume displays the same rigorous archival research and remorseless revisionism as the previous two. Alone, it is an important contribution to First World War studies. Together with its predecessors, it represents an impressive scholarly achievement. This is history for grown-ups. It will not please everyone. Read it and decide for yourself.' J.M. Bourne, University of Birmingham, The Historical Association 1997