About the Book
Perception is basic for human knowledge and a major concern of both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The scholarship in this area, however, has left two important aspects of perception underexplored: its relevance to understanding a priori knowledge--traditionally conceived as independent of perception--and its role in human action. This book provides a full-scale account of perception, a theory of the a priori, and an account of how
perception guides action. In exploring perception and action, it clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning, the notion of rational action, and the relation between knowledge of the practical (of how things
are done) and practical knowledge (knowing how to do things).
In the first part of the book, Robert Audi lays out a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects. He argues that perception is a discriminative response to its objects; it embodies phenomenally distinctive elements; and it yields rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. Audi's
theory is perceptualist in that it explicates the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory also unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable
causal connections with their objects--connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge. The final part explores how perception guides action, the role of propositional knowledge in our abilities to do what we know how to do, the nature of reasons for action, the role of inference in determining it, and the overall conditions for its rationality. Addressing longstanding questions left unaddressed in the current literature, Audi's comprehensive theory of perception will
appeal to scholars and students interested in philosophy of perception, mind, and epistemology.
Table of Contents:
Preface Acknowledgments Introduction Part One: Perception Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the Physical World I. Perception Broadly Conceived
II. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of Perception
III. The Representational Character of Perception Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content I. Three Categories of Perceptual Content
II. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian Propositions
III. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts I. Perception and Action: The Structural Analogy II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical Objects III. Awareness of Events and Abstract Entities
IV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual Levels
V. Is Perception Theory-Laden?
VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification I. Perceptual Knowledge
II. The Hierarchical Character of Perception
III. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal Dimensions
IV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation I. The Diversity of Reasons for Belief
II. Reasons as Distinguished from Grounds
III. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical Analogy
IV. Reasons as Explanations
V. Normative Reasons and their Grounds Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification I. Epistemological Internalism
II. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?
III. The Practice-Relativity of Justification
IV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and Justification
V. The Disjunctivist Challenge
VI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual Belief
VII. Perception and Singular Reference Part Two: Perception and the A Priori Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension I. Perception and Intuition
II. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional Discourse
III. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist Traditions
IV. Intuitions as Apprehensions Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori I. The Concept of Self-Evidence
II. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evident
III. Understanding and Imagination
IV. Major Elements in the Understanding of Propositions
V. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional Justification
VI. Comprehensional Adequacy
VII. Obstacles to Comprehension Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity I. Self-Evidence and Provability
II. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident? III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the Credible
IV. Apprehension of Abstract Entities
V. Apriority and Necessity Part Three: Practical Knowledge Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action I. Belief and Action
II. Two Orders of Cognitive Disposition
III. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the Practical
III. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected Category
IV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational Action
I. Inference and Inferential Belief
II. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-Formation
III. Reasoning and Rational Action
IV. The Scope of Rational Action
V. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency Conclusion: Perception, Apprehension, and Action References Index
About the Author :
Robert Audi, John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame Robert Audi is internationally known for his books, articles, and lectures in ethics (including political philosophy), the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of mind and action, and the philosophy of religion. His books since 2000 include Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge 2000), a theory of the relation between church and state and, for individuals, between religion and politics; The Architecture of Reason (Oxford 2001), a theory of
rationality that provides a partial foundation for ethics; The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton 2004), a presentation of some main elements in Audi's view in ethics; Practical Reasoning and Ethical
Decision (Routledge 2006), an account of the nature and varieties of practical reasoning and its relation to moral standards; Moral Value and Human Diversity (Oxford 2007), a non-technical presentation of major approaches in ethics and value theory; Rationality and Religious Commitment (Oxford 2011), a comprehensive monograph in philosophy of religion (derived from the Wilde Lectures given much earlier at Oxford); Moral Perception (Princeton 2013), a theory
of perceptual moral knowledge and its relation to emotion, intuition, and objectivity in ethics; Seeing, Knowing, and Doing (Oxford 2020), an account of perception of the physical, apprehension of the abstract, and how both underlie our
actions; Of Moral Conduct: A Theory of Obligation, Reasons, and Value (Cambridge 2023); and (as Editor) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge, 3rd ed. 2015). Audi is a past president of the American Philosophical Association, a former director of National Endowment for the Humanities Seminars and Institutes, a recipient of prizes and honors for lifetime contributions to philosophy, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and presently John A. O'Brien
Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame. His B. A. is from Colgate University, his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan.
Review :
Audi is one of the most distinguished and prolific analytic philosophers working today ... The argumentation in is rich and complex . . . the book represents an important contribution to current debates in epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
Seeing, Knowing and Doing is a gem. Clearly and concisely, it manages to tackle some of the deepest issues in epistemology. . . such as the nature of perception, its role in justification, the relationship between justification and knowledge, the nature and extent of the a priori, the nature of know-how and the relation between perception and action, while proposing innovative views on all these fronts.
Seeing, Knowing, and Doing offers a comprehensive picture of perception, knowledge, and agency. At its center is the idea that perception is a starting point for knowledge, as for many other epistemic and practical achievements. The book tells a complete story of the role of perception in our cognitive and epistemic lives. Wide-ranging and rigorous, it balances respect for our intuitions with theoretical consistency and completeness.
Throughout his distinguished career, Audi has reflected as deeply as anyone on the nature and role of perceptual experience as guides to belief and action, where his own reflection is informed by his penetrating account of a priori justification as grounded in self-evidence. Engaging contemporary debates on the a priori, perceptual knowledge, practical reason, know-how, and action, Seeing, Knowing, and Doing provides a first-rate elaboration of Audi's unique perspective on the normativity of experience for both belief and action.
