Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment

The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment contests this skeptical conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident belief even in the face of the epistemic worries posed by disagreement. John Pittard argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, while also critiquing approaches to disagreement that allow for the unproblematic privileging of one's first-person perspective. He emphasizes the importance of having rational insight into reasons that favor one's outlook; however, he challenges narrowly intellectualist accounts of insight, arguing that many of the rational insights crucial to assessing religious outlooks are not achievable through analytical reasoning, but only through relevant emotional experiences. In the second part of the book, Pittard considers the implications that accepting the impartiality requirement favored by "disagreement skeptics" has for religious commitment. He challenges the common assumption that a commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality would rule out confident religious belief. He further argues, however, that such an impartiality commitment would likely make it irrational to pursue one's favored form of religious life and might prevent one from rationally engaging in any religious or irreligious way of life whatsoever. This troubling conclusion gives reason to hope that the arguments against impartiality are correct and that one can justify conviction despite widespread disagreement.

Table of Contents:
Acknowledgments Introduction 1 Topic and Approach 2 Overview of Chapters and Reading Guide Part I: Against Impartiality Chapter 1: Disagreement-Motivated Religious Skepticism and the Commitment to Impartiality Chapter 2: De-Motivating Reasons Impartiality Chapter 3: From Impartiality to Instrumentalism Chapter 4: Partisan Justification and Religious Belief Chapter 5: Affective Rationalism and Religious Insight Part II: What Does Impartiality Require? Chapter 6: Elusive Impartiality Chapter 7: Unpalatable Conclusions and Deliberative Vertigo Conclusion References

About the Author :
John Pittard is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion at Yale Divinity School, with a secondary appointment in the Yale Department of Philosophy. He received his Ph.D. from Yale, his M.Div. from Princeton Theological Seminary, and his A.B. from Harvard. He works in epistemology and the philosophy of religion.

Review :
...the depth and scope of the book's many arguments facilitate a fecund account that clarifies central issues for future disagreements about religious disagreement. It is essential reading for scholars of disagreement and religion alike. Pittard's book is a valuable contribution to the large and growing body of literature regarding agreement and disagreement. It is the most complete and detailed account of how and why to resist strong conciliationism. Most convincing, to my mind, is the role that rational insight can play in a full account of the matter, and Pittard's account of this role will be part of must-read literature for any future discussions of these issues. To say that this is a book in religious epistemology is slightly misleading. For this book is, I think, required reading for any epistemologist working on disagreement. Likewise, given the sceptical threat to religious belief posed by conciliationism I also think that this book is required reading for the philosopher of religion. To genuinely engage two subdisciplines in philosophy in one unified project is an impressive feat in itself. My sense is that Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment is just the beginning for Pittard. I highly recommend it and I look forward to reading more of his work. John Pittard's book focuses on religious commitment, but his volume is also an impressive examination of the broader epistemological issues in play. It is the most thorough scholarly treatment yet of how to think about the epistemology of disagreement as it applies to the rationality of religious belief in an increasingly pluralistic world. Readers who are less interested in the epistemology of religion will nevertheless be rewarded by Pittard's carefully developed insights on disagreement and its lessons for mainstream epistemology. John Pittard's recent book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, is, in my view, easily the most sophisticated piece of work today in analytic philosophy on the problem of disagreement for religious belief and commitment." - Joshua C. Thurow, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism “John Pittard has done a great service to the epistemology of disagreement literature with his recent book. Reading through this important contribution, one cannot help but get the impression that, even after all these years of a sprawling literature, significant and conversation-changing progress can still be made. We believe Pittard has made that sort of progress.” - Tomas Bogardus and Michael Burton, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism