Arguments and Reason-Giving

Arguments help us to give reasons for things. We use them to advance reasons for their conclusions in order to explain why we believe or did something, to justify our beliefs or actions, and to persuade others to do or to believe something. In Arguments and Reason-Giving, philosopher Matthew W. McKeon addresses the uses of arguments to advance their premises as reasons for believing their conclusions, that is, for believing that their conclusions are true. This book has two parts. In the first part, McKeon develops a conception of reason-giving uses of arguments that aims to deepen our understanding of the argument-centric dimension of our practices of reason-giving in everyday contexts. Inference claims play a central role in reason-giving uses of arguments. You use an argument to advance its premises as reasons for believing the conclusion only if you claim that they are such reasons. Taking such reason-giving to be rationally intentional, you believe what you claim. In the second part of the book, McKeon appeals to this conception of reason-giving uses of arguments to shed light on the nature of their persuasive force, the nature of the inferential reasoning that is expressed, argumentative rationality, and intellectual honesty and intellectual integrity. The notions of inference claims, reasons for belief, and reflective inferences provide the conceptual framework for the book's engagement with reason-giving uses of arguments and rational persuasion, argumentative rationality, and intellectual honesty and integrity.

Table of Contents:
Chapter 1: Introduction Part I: Arguments, Inference Claims, and Reflective Inference Chapter 2: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments 2.1 Preamble 2.2 Arguing and arguments 2.3 Arguments in informal logic, argumentation studies, and formal logic 2.3.1 Arguments in informal logic 2.3.2 Argumentation studies 2.3.3 Arguments in formal logic 2.4 Reason-giving uses of arguments 2.5 Conclusion Chapter 3: Inference Claims 3.1 Preamble 3.2 Argument claims and uses of arguments 3.3 The connection between inference claims and reason-giving uses of argument 3.3.1 Inference claim and reasons for believing 3.3.2 Dialectical arguments and reason-giving uses of arguments 3.4 How, exactly, are inference claims conveyed by one's statement of an argument? 3.4.1 Mere implication 3.4.2 Conversational implicature 3.4.3 Conventional implicature 3.4.4 Assertion 3.5 Conclusion Chapter 4: Reflective Inference 4.1 Preamble 4.2 Critical Thinking 4.2.1 Baseline characterizations of critical thinking 4.2.2 Inference and critical thinking 4.3 Reflective inferences and reason-giving uses of arguments 4.4 Conclusion Part II: Formal Validity, Rational Persuasion, Argumentative Rationality, Intellectual Honest and Intellectual Integrity Chapter 5: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments, Formally Valid Arguments, and Demonstrative Arguments 5.1 Preamble 5.2 Deductive arguments, demonstrative arguments, and reflective inferences 5.3 Formally valid arguments and demonstrative arguments 5.4 Formally valid arguments and reason-giving uses of arguments 5.5 Demonstrative arguments and reason-giving uses of arguments 5.6 Conclusion Chapter 6: Reason-Giving Uses of Argument, Invitations to Inference, and Rational Persuasion 6.1 Preamble 6.2 Invitations to inference are reason-giving uses of arguments 6.3 Invitations to inference invite only the inferences expressed by the arguments used 6.4 Indirect persuasion 6.5 Conclusion Chapter 7: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments and Argumentative Rationality 7.1 Preamble 7.2 Reason for belief and the rationality of belief 7.3 The Pragma-epistemic approach to argumentative rationality 7.4. The epistemic and pragma-dialectic approaches to argumentative rationality 7.4.1 The objective epistemic approach to argumentative rationality 7.4.2 The Pragma-dialectic approach to argumentative rationality 7.5 Argumentative rationality and good argumentation 7.6 Conclusion Chapter 8: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments, Intellectual Honesty, and Intellectual integrity 8.1 Preamble 8.2 Intellectual honesty and truthfulness 8.3 Reason-giving uses of arguments and intellectual honesty 8.4 Reason-giving uses of arguments and intellectual integrity 8.5 Conclusion Index

About the Author :
Matthew W. McKeon is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University where he has been Chair of the Department of Philosophy since 2011.

Review :
McKeon conceives of an argument as being something that can be used as an inferential statement and is the type of reason-giving argument often depicted in argumentation and informal logic literature. He views such an argument as a rationally intentional argument, which offers premises providing reasons for believing its conclusion is true.