Governing Security After War: The Politics of Institutional Change in the Security Sector

Security assistance has become the largest component of international peacebuilding and stabilization efforts, and a primary tool for responding to civil war and insurgency. Donors and peacekeepers not only train and equip military and police forces, they also seek to overhaul their structure, management, and oversight. Yet, we know little about why these efforts succeed or fail. Efforts to restructure security forces in Iraq, Libya, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and the Democratic Republic of Congo ended amidst factional fighting. Similar efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Bosnia and Herzegovina helped to transform security forces and underpin peace. What accounts for the mixed outcomes of efforts to restructure security forces after civil war? What is the role of external involvement on these outcomes? In Governing Security After War, Louis-Alexandre Berg examines the political dimensions of security governance through systematic, cross-country comparison. Berg argues that the extent to which state policymakers adopt changes to the management and oversight of security forces depends on internal political dynamics, specifically the degree to which leaders need to consolidate power. The different political strategies leaders pursue, in turn, affect opportunities for external actors to influence institutional changes through means such as conditions on aid, norm diffusion, or day-to-day participation in decision-making. Drawing on an original dataset of security governance and field research in Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Timor-Leste, as well as mini-case studies of Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Somalia, Berg draws out novel implications that help explain the recurrence of civil war and the impact of foreign aid on peacebuilding. Moreover, Berg provides practical recommendations for navigating the political challenges of institutional change in conflict-affected countries. Ultimately, Governing Security After War seeks to explain the success and failure of international assistance in war-torn countries and sheds light on the politics of peacebuilding.

Table of Contents:
List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. The Politics of Postwar Security Governance Chapter 3. Strength in Vulnerability: Military and Police Restructuring in Liberia Chapter 4. Politics of Fear: Police and Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina Chapter 5. Influence of Riches: The Timor-Leste National Police Chapter 6. Across Postwar Countries and Beyond: Statistical Analysis of Security Governance Chapter 7. Conclusion Appendix Bibliography Index

About the Author :
Louis-Alexandre Berg is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University. His research examines the causes and consequences of violent conflict and crime in developing countries, and the effects of international security assistance and peacebuilding programs. He has worked extensively on peacebuilding and security assistance programs in the field, and served as an adviser to the United Nations, the World Bank, and the U.S. Government. He holds a PhD from Georgetown University, an MA from Princeton University, and a BA from Brown University.

Review :
International actors have long sought to help post-conflict societies build new militaries—often with mixed success. Berg's new book provides an illuminating explanation for why they are likely to succeed and fail. He shows how local political elites' struggles to consolidate power—and the resources and networks on which they rely—shape the management and control of the armed forces. Fascinating and compelling, Berg's research is a major advancement in understanding the character and origins of states' security sectors. This is a fantastic book. Louis-Alexandre Berg demonstrates how a clearer understanding of the interplay between elite actors' interests in war-torn states holds the key to crafting strategies for lasting security sector reform. Wonderfully executed, this is an important contribution to the study of post-conflict reform. Arguing against the now common claim in the wake of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan that recipients of assistance inevitably lack the political will to use it wisely, Berg shows how the right kinds of international attention to domestic political dynamics can leverage real domestic interest in reform. This well-written book is a must-read for scholars and practitioners, and will have a lasting effect on how we think about security sector reform. Berg's volume, Governing Security after War, really sets the scene by providing an overarching framework to institutional interventions.