How to Count Animals, more or less: (Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics)

Most people agree that animals count morally. But how, exactly, should we take animals into account? According to a prominent position in contemporary philosophical discussions, animals and people have the very same moral status, so in our moral deliberations the otherwise similar interests of people and animals should be given the same weight and consideration. In How to Count Animals, more or less, Shelly Kagan rejects this view. In its place, Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach, one in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. Unfortunately, most moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take into account these differences in moral status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality--and exploring what appropriate, status sensitive principles might look like--Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our duties toward animals, and of morality more generally.

Table of Contents:
Introduction 1: Standing 2: Unitarianism 3: The Argument from Distribution 4: Hierarchy and the Value of Outcomes 5: Status 6: Worries about Hierarchy 7: Deontology 8: Restricted Deontology 9: Hierarchical Deontology 10: Defense 11: Limited Hierarchy

About the Author :
Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale, where he has taught since 1995. He was an undergraduate at Wesleyan University and received his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 1982. Before coming to Yale, Professor Kagan taught at the University of Pittsburgh and at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He is the author of The Limits of Morality, Normative Ethics, and The Geometry of Desert. The videos of his undergraduate class on death (available online) have been popular around the world, and the book based on the course, Death, was a national bestseller in South Korea.

Review :
An excellent articulation of the view that while animals count, humans count for more In this excellent book, Shelly Kagan defends a sophisticated answer to the question whether or not moral status comes in degrees. His answer is: yes and no, but mostly yes. In particular, he argues for a view that he calls 'limited hierarchy', according to which (a) people have higher moral status than animals (and some animals have higher moral status than others), but (b) all people have equal moral status. At first glance, this view seems as though it has no chance of working. But Kagan is a brilliant philosopher, and through a series of clever moves . . . he makes a surprisingly strong case for his view. . . an essential contribution to the literature. A thorough, insightful, accessible, and immensely rewarding discussion of the kind of relative status we should seek between humans and nonhumans.