The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters(Bridging the Gap)

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first coherent theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.

Table of Contents:
Preface New Foreword for the Paperback Edition Abbreviations and Acronyms Introduction PART I. The Advantages of Nuclear Advantages Chapter 1. Toward a New Theory of Nuclear Deterrence: The Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory Chapter 2. Nuclear War Outcomes Chapter 3. The Correlates of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes Chapter 4. The Mechanisms of Nuclear Crisis Outcomes Chapter 5. Nuclear Deterrence and Compellence PART II. The Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages? Chapter 6. Strategic Stability Chapter 7. Arms Races Chapter 8. Nuclear Nonproliferation Chapter 9. The Defense Budget Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

About the Author :
Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and the Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He is the author or editor of seven books, including The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the Present.

Review :
"Because there is now more available data, the time is right to reexamine some long-held assumptions about whether a significant advantage in nuclear weapons is, in fact, an advantage. Matthew Kroenig offers new theoretical and methodological perspectives in his attempt to do just that. Theoretically, he proposes a synthesis of two theories to argue that nuclear superiority allows for a state to be more aggressive in international crises. Methodologically, he seeks to demonstrate the effect a single independent variable has on multiple dependent variables. Either one of these advances would represent a significant contribution to the literature of nuclear statecraft and compellence. Kroenig combines both in a thorough and compelling work." -- Cory Hollon, Air University, Air War College, H-War "The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy is a major contribution to the national debate about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. Matthew Kroenig provides penetrating insights into how nuclear posture affects a variety of national security interests and the book is a must read for anyone who wishes to understand this increasingly vital set of issues." -Stephen Hadley, former National Security Adviser to U.S. President George W. Bush "A provocative contribution from a next-gen scholar to the revival of debate about nuclear strategy." -Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School "Matthew Kroenig's comprehensive research, analysis, and conclusions provide a compilation of insights and information that policy makers and military leaders must understand. This book should be required reading for policy makers, strategists, and military leaders, as well as students of military strategy and international affairs." -Cecil Haney, former Commander US Strategic Command "Matthew Kroenig has provided an innovative and counter-intuitive study of why nuclear superiority might matter and why practitioners of both political parties have gravitated consistently towards it even as academic theorists have argued that it doesn't matter. This is an agenda setting book that will be debated by scholars and policy-makers for years to come." -Eric Edelman, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Hertog Practitioner-in-Residence at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies "Contrary to much that has been written on the subject, in this provocative new study Matthew Kroenig argues that the United States can attain, and should seek, meaningful military superiority over other nuclear-armed states. This is an important statement of a controversial position that deserves to be read and debated by both policy makers and political scientists." -Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University "[Matthew Kroenig] nuanced analysis is original and draws on a wide range of literature on nuclear strategy, crisis bargaining, weapons proliferation, arms races, deterrence and compellence. He offers a novel "superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory" to explain the logic of America's nuclear strategy, informed by academic research, practical concerns, and behaviors of policy makers."- J. P. Smaldone, CHOICE