About the Book
This debate-style reader is assembled to introduce students to controversies in cognitive science. The scientific quest to understand human thinking and to imitate thinking artificially with computer software is surrounded by controversies from theory to application. The readings represent the arguments of leading cognitive scientists, researchers, and psychologists. They reflect opposing viewpoints and the issues have been selected for their substance, vitality, and relevance. By requiring students to analyze these issues and reach considered judgments, Taking Sides actively develops critical thinking, research, and presentation skills. For additional support for this title, visit our student website: www.dushkin.com/online
Table of Contents:
PART 1. Mind and Brain ISSUE 1. Are Mind and Brain the Same? YES: Paul C.L. Tang, from “A Review Essay: Recent Literature on Cognitive Science,” Social Science Journal (1999) NO: Jon Mills, from “Five Dangers of Materialism,” Genetic, Social & General Psychology Monographs (February 2002) Philosophy professor Paul C. L. Tang explains the argument thatanything usually attributed to the mind is only brain activity by describingthe position of Paul Churchland, a leader in the field of cognitive science.Researcher Jon Mills points out five dangers of dismissing a concept ofmind, such as the elimination of free will and a sense of self, and insteadproposes a psychic holism. ISSUE 2. Do Children Develop Theories About Other People’s Minds? YES: Henry Wellman, David Cross, and Julanne Watson, from “Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth About False Belief,” Child Development (2001) NO: Brian J. Scholl and Alan M. Leslie, from “Minds, Modules, and Meta-Analysis,” Child Development (2001) Senior research scientist Henry Wellman and his colleagues, DavidCross and Julanne Watson, present a meta-analysis revealing supportfor their belief that stage-related conceptual changes bring about anunderstanding of theory-of-mind in small children. Cognitive researchersBrian Scholl and Alan Leslie argue that the data do not supportconceptual change but rather the development of innate specific skillsthat lead to children’s understanding of theory-of-mind. ISSUE 3. Is Mindfulness a Cognitive Style? YES: Robert J. Sternberg, from “Images of Mindfulness,” Journal of Social Issues (2000) NO: Ellen J. Langer and Mihnea Moldoveanu, from “The Construct of Mindfulness,” Journal of Social Issues (2000) American Psychological Association president Robert Sternberg makesthe case that the concept of mindfulness would be enhanced byassociation with the area of cognitive styles. Psychology professorsEllen Langer and Mihnea Moldoveanu find Sternberg’s cognitive stylecategory inadequate and much too restrictive for the concept ofmindfulness.PART 2. Concepts ISSUE 4. Are We Overestimating Infants' Math Ability? YES: Leslie B. Cohen and Kathryn S. Marks, from “How Infants Process Addition and Subtraction Events,” Developmental Science (2002) NO: Karen Wynn, from “Do Infants Have Numerical Expectations or Just Perceptual Preferences?” Devlopmental Science (2002) Professor of psychology Leslie Cohen and his research associateKathryn Marks make the case that infants prefer to stare longer, and thusrespond more, to familiar situations as compared to novel ones, and thatthis has been mistaken for numerical understanding. Psychologist andresearcher Karen Wynn argues that her assumptions are sound, and thatinfants are capable of calculating the outcomes of very basic addition andsubtraction problems. ISSUE 5. Can Infants Develop Abstract Concepts? YES: Jean M. Mandler, from “Perceptual and Conceptual Processes in Infancy,” Journal of Cognition and Development (2000) NO: Eleanor J. Gibson, from “Commentary on Perceptual and Conceptual Processes in Infancy,” Journal of Cognition and Development (2000) Research professor of cognitive science Jean Mandler providesevidence to show that, counter to traditional cognitive developmentaltheory, infants are capable of abstract conceptual processing. NationalMedal of Science recipient Eleanor Gibson questions the assumptionsMandler makes regarding preverbal infants and presents her own viewthat perceptual development leads children into conceptual processing. ISSUE 6. Is Sensory Information the Strongest Part of a Stored Concept? YES: Helen Bird, David Howard, and Sue Franklin, from “Why Is a Verb Like an Inanimate Object?” Brain and Language (2000) NO: Kevin Shapiro and Alfonso Caramazza, from “Sometimes a Noun Is Just a Noun: Comments on Bird, Howard, and Franklin,” Brain and Language (2001) Researchers and lecturers Helen Bird, David Howard, and Sue Franklinpresent research consistent with a new model of knowledgerepresentation that emphasizes sensory and functional categories.Linguistic researchers Kevin Shapiro and Alfonso Caramazza providenumerous challenges to the new model and caution against a search forone explanatory model.PART 3. Memory ISSUE 7. Is Novice Memory Based on Associations? YES: Pertti Saariluoma and Tei Laine, from “Novice Construction of Chess Memory,” Scandinavian Journal of Psychology (2001) NO: Fernand Gobet, from “Chunk Hierarchies and Retrieval Structures: Comments on Saariluoma and Laine,” Scandinavian Journal of Psychology (2001) Cognitive scientists Pertti Saariluoma and Tei Laine present the casethat through computer simulation they can demonstrate that associationsmade between frequent types of chess pieces and the colors of thepieces were the most salient aspects in novices learning chess patterns.Professor of intelligence systems Fernand Gobet argues thatSaariluoma and Laine have not properly modeled human memory, andwith a more competent computer simulation it is clear that proximity orlocation is the most salient feature in remembering chess patterns. ISSUE 8. Is Imagination Inflation Imaginary? YES: Kathy Pezdek and Rebecca M. Eddy, from “Imagination Inflation: A Statistical Artifact of Regression Toward the Mean,” Memory & Cognition (2001) NO: Maryanne Garry, Stefanie Sharman, Kimberley A. Wade, Maree J. Hunt, and Peter J. Smith, from “Imagination Inflation Is a Fact, Not an Artifact: A Reply to Pezdek and Eddy,” Memory & Cognition (2001) Professors of psychology Kathy Pezdek and Rebecca Eddy demonstratethrough analysis and replication of a primary investigation that falsememories are not being planted through imagination, but rather theresearchers have been fooled by the statistical principle of regressiontoward the mean. Researchers and lecturers Maryanne Garry, StefanieSharman, Kimberley Wade, Maree Hunt, and Peter Smith argue thatPezdek and Eddy have performed inappropriate statistical analyses, andthe proper treatment of the data further demonstrates the phenomenonof imagination inflation. ISSUE 9. Is Adult Memory for Childhood Abuse Unreliable? YES: Peter A. Ornstein, Stephen J. Ceci, and Elizabeth F. Loftus, from “Adult Recollections of Childhood Abuse: Cognitive and Developmental Perspectives,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (1998) NO: Judith L. Alpert, Laura S. Brown, and Christine A. Courtois, from “Comment on Ornstein, Ceci, and Loftus (1998): Adult Recollections of Childhood Abuse,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (1998) Professors of psychology and law Peter Ornstein, Stephen Ceci, andElizabeth Loftus question the accuracy of adult memories for child abuseby explaining the many delicate and malleable features of humanmemory that can create false memories. Law professor Judith Alpert andclinical psychologists Laura Brown and Christine Courtois respond bychallenging the memory researchers’ understanding of trauma researchand psychotherapy, and by accusing them of undermining the healingprocess of abuse victims.PART 4. Language ISSUE 10. Is Context Stronger Than Frequency? YES: Charles Martin, Hoang Vu, George Kellas, and Kimberly Metcalf, from “Strength of Discourse Context as a Determinant of the Subordinate Bias Effect,” The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (1999) NO: Keith Rayner, Katherine S. Binder, and Susan A. Duffy, from “Contextual Strength and the Subordinate Bias Effect: Comment on Martin, Vu, Kellas, and Metcalf,” The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (1999) Psychology professors Charles Martin, Hoang Vu, George Kellas, andKimberly Metcalf demonstrate that human memory retrieval is influencedmost by context when selectively searching for the meaning ofambiguous words. Cognitive researchers Keith Rayner, KatherineBinder, and Susan Duffy argue that when appropriate stimuli are used,research results indicate that memory retrieval is influenced most by theorder in which possible meanings are retrieved when trying to find theintended meaning of ambiguous words. ISSUE 11. Is Stuttering Isolated from Lexical Retrieval? YES: Ann Packman, Mark Onslow, Tanya Coombes, and Angela Goodwin, from “Stuttering and Lexical Retrieval,” Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics (2001) NO: James Au-Yeung and Peter Howell, from “Non-Word Reading, Lexical Retrieval and Stuttering: Comments on Packman, Onslow, Coombes and Goodwin,” Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics (2002) Senior researchers Ann Packman and Mark Onslow, along with theirresearch assistants Tanya Coombes and Angela Goodwin, demonstratethat stuttering occurs even when there is no lexical or meaningfulcontent connected to the spoken words. Computational linguist JamesAu-Yeung and professor of experimental psychology Peter Howell arguethat the study by Packman, et al. is so full of flaws that it explains verylittle about stuttering. ISSUE 12. Can Computer Models Explain Language Disorders? YES: William Frawley, from “Control and Cross-Domain Mental Computation: Evidence from Language Breakdown,” Com
putational Intelligence (2002) NO: B. Chandrasekaran, from “Reach Exceeds Grasp: Comments on Frawley’s ’Control and Cross-Domain Mental Computation: Evidence from Language Breakdown,’” Computational Intelligence (2002) Professor of linguistics and cognitive science William Frawley proposesthat some language disorders are actually breakdowns in the controlmechanisms of the brain, similar to the control breakdowns found incomputational models. Senior research scientist B. Chandrasekaranbelieves Frawley has made the mistake of taking the brain-as-computeranalogy as fact, and thus his conjectured arguments are of little value.PART 5. Intelligence ISSUE 13. Is Emotional Intelligence Really a Form of Intelligence? YES: John D. Mayer, Peter Salovey, and David Caruso, from “Models of Emotional Intelligence,” Handbook of Intelligence (2000) NO: Richard D. Roberts, Moshe Zeidner, and Gerald Matthews, from “Does Emotional Intelligence Meet Traditional Standards for an Intelligence? Some New Data and Conclusions,” Emotion (2001) Psychologists John Mayer, Peter Salovey, and David Caruso presenttheir case that emotional intelligence is as valid as any type ofintelligence based on the performance of the Multifactor EmotionalIntelligence Scale (MEIS). Researchers and lecturers Richard Roberts,Moshe Zeidner, and Gerald Matthews find the Multifactor EmotionalIntelligence Scale to be disappointing and the whole concept ofemotional intelligence to be questionable. ISSUE 14. Is the Birth Order Effect on Intelligence Real? YES: Joseph Lee Rodgers, H. Harrington Cleveland, Edwin van den Oord, and David C. Rowe, from “Resolving the Debate Over Birth Order, Family Size, and Intelligence,” American Psychologist (June 2000) NO: R.B. Zajonc, from “The Family Dynamics of Intellectual Development,” American Psychologist (June/July 2001) Professors of psychology Joseph Rodgers, H. Harrington Cleveland,Edwin van den Oord, and David Rowe present the case that birth orderand intelligence are not related, and because of that psychologistsshould not claim that large families produce lower-IQ children.Psychologist and researcher R. B. Zajonc argues that family dynamicschange as each new sibling is added, and this change is related to lessintellectual development in children born to larger families.PART 6. Reasoning and Intuition ISSUE 15. Can a Neural Network Model Account for Moral Development? YES: Paul M. Churchland, from “Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues,” The Foundations of Cognitive Science (2001) NO: Darcia Narvaez and Tonia Bock, from “Moral Schemas and Tacit Judgment or How the Defining Issues Test is Supported by Cognitive Science,” Journal of Moral Education (2002) Professor of philosophy Paul Churchland offers a cognitive science viewof human moral reasoning through the development of a neural networkmodel. Moral development researchers Darcia Narvaez and Tonia Bockrely on the cognitive science of Piaget and information processing theoryto explain moral reasoning. ISSUE 16. Do We Use Reasoning to Make Moral Decisions? YES: James R. Rest, Darcia Narvaez, Stephen J. Thoma, and Muriel J. Bebeau, from “A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Morality Research,” Journal of Moral Education (2000) NO: Jonathan Haidt, from “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review (2001) The research team of James Rest, Darcia Narvaez, Stephen Thoma,and Muriel Bebeau present the case that, based on over 25 years ofresearch using the Defining Issues Test, humans move through stagesof moral reasoning that guide moral decision-making processes.Psychologist Jonathan Haidt argues that the social intuitionist model,which proposes that humans have quick intuitions about moral issuesthat lead to reasoning for the sole purpose of justifying the previousintuitions, better explains moral cognition. ISSUE 17. Is Intuition a Valid Way of Knowing? YES: Helen H. I. McCutcheon and Jan Pincombe, from “Intuition: An Important Tool in the Practice of Nursing,” Journal of Advanced Nursing (2001) NO: Mary Ann Rosswurm and June H. Larrabee, from “A Model for Change for Evidence-Based Practice,” Image: Journal of Nursing Scholarship (1999) Clinical nursing researchers Helen McCutcheon and Jan Pincombemake the case that any health care decisions made by nurses that arebased on intuition should be considered as rational and valid, and shouldbe documented as part of a patient’s medical record. Professors ofnursing Mary Ann Rosswurm and June Larrabee advocate for anevidence-based decision-making process for nurses that involves criticalanalysis of current research. ISSUE 18. Should Schools Teach for Wisdom? YES: Robert J. Sternberg, from “Why Schools Should Teach for Wisdom: The Balance Theory of Wisdom in Educational Settings,” Educational Psychologist (2001) NO: Scott G. Paris, from “Wisdom, Snake Oil, and the Educational Marketplace,” Educational Psychologist (2001) American Psychological Association president and author RobertJ. Sternberg believes that schools need to teach wisdom-related skillsrather than focus exclusively on imparting knowledge. Professor ofpsychology Scott G. Paris counters these suggestions by arguing thatSternberg’s description of wisdom is contradictory and his suggestionsare out of touch with the political and commercial nature of education.
