The Gold Standard Illusion: France, the Bank of France, and the International Gold Standard, 1914-1939

Economic historians have established a new orthodoxy attributing the onset and severity of the Great Depression to the flawed workings of the international gold standard. This interpretation returns French gold policy to centre stage in understanding the origins of the Depression, its rapid spread, its severity and its duration. The Gold Standard Illusion exploits new archival resources to test how well this gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression is sustained by historical records in France, the country most often criticized for hoarding gold and failure to play by the rules of the gold standard game. The study follows four lines of inquiry, providing a history of French gold policy in its national and international contexts from 1914 to 1939, an analysis of the evolution of the Bank of France during this period and the degree to which gold standard belief retarded the adoption of modern central banking practice, a re-examination of interwar central bank cooperation in the period and its role in the breakdown of the gold standard, and a study of how gold standard rhetoric fostered misperceptions of financial and monetary problems.The French case was exceptional, marked by absolute and tenacious faith in the gold standard, by the import and accumulation of a vast hoard of gold desperately needed as reserves to prevent monetary contraction abroad, and by adamant claims for the need to return to gold after most countries had left the gold standard, which had become, in the words of John Maynard Keynes, 'a curse laid upon the economic life of the world'. The Gold Standard Illusion explains French gold standard belief and policy, the impact of French policy at home and abroad, and reassesses the gold standard interpretation of the Great Depression in the light of French experience.

Table of Contents:
Introduction 1: The gold standard and central banking to 1914 2: The worm in the fruit 3: Deflation in practice 4: The franc in peril 5: The guillotine's clean cut: The Bank of France and the Poincaré stabilization 6: Rather a faith than a theory: central bank co-operation, 1916-30 7: The gold standard illusion 8: Towards modern central banking 9: Conclusions Appendix I Appendix II

About the Author :
Born in Calgary AB on 31 March 1956. B.A. in Economics, University of Calgary (1980); M.A. in European History, SUNY at Stony Brook (1981); Ph.D. in European History, University of Toronto (1988). Currently Professor of History at UC Santa Barbara, where he has taught since 1989. Member of the School of Historical Studies, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton NJ, 1991-1993.

Review :
Moure has written an outstanding book: it bring together an enormous mass of data and interprets it with lucidity; it is also well written and easy to read. It will be indispensable to any student not only of french, but of international, economic history during the inter-war period. EHR Timely ... The strength of the book lies in its analysis of the politics of the Banque, an analysis that makes use of new archival evidence ... Moure explains technical terms like 'gold points' with admirable clarity, and the book may be read with advantage by anyone interested in French political or economic history. French History Moure is the first historian to make such an extensive use of the archives of the Bank of France. He provides the reader with a well-balanced, complete and up-to-date review of the literature. EH.Net Book Review Scholarly ... Moure tells the story with an impressive narrative verve and, unusually, tries to see the situation from a French perspective. Tim Congdon, Times Literary Supplement