The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice

The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von Clausewitz, Sun-tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.

Table of Contents:
Preface Introduction: Surviving Clausewitz PART I: THEORY 1: The Theory of Strategy, I: Enduring Nature, Changing Character 2: The Theory of Strategy, II: Construction, Execution, and Consequences 3: Politics, War, and Strategy PART II: PRACTICE 4: Problems with Strategy: Often a Bridge too Far 5: The Product: Strategic Effect 6: Strategy, Strategists, and Command Performance: Joining Up the Dots PART III: CONTEXT AND PURPOSE 7: Conclusion: Bandit Country and the Strategist's Quest for Control Appendices Appendix A The Dicta of Strategy Appendix B General Strategic Theory, the Classical Canon Appendix C Conceptual 'Hueys' at Thermopylae? The Challenge of Strategic Anachronism Appendix D Potent Trinities: Fourteen Skeleton Keys of Theory for the Strategist Bibliography

About the Author :
Dr. Colin S. Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading in England. He is a dual US-UK citizen and serves as an adviser in Washington, DC, and London. He was educated in England at the Universities of Manchester and Oxford. Dr. Gray has taught at universities in Britain, Canada, and the United States, has been assistant director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), and worked with Herman Kahn at the Hudson Institute before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington. From 1982 until 1987 he held a presidential appointment on the President's Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament.

Review :
`One of the most detailed and important investigations of the concept of strategy published in recent decades.' C.Dale Walton, Lindenwood University `It would be professional malfeasance . . . to overlook The Strategy Bridge.' Bradford Lee, Journal of Strategic Studies `it is far more than a textbook, though it certainly can and should be used for instructional purposes. In terms of rigor, Strategy Bridge is every bit as scientific as Clausewitz's On War, but much more accessible . . . It's synthetic nature and analytic rigor make Colin Gray's Strategy Bridge a necessary, and welcome, addition to any educator's already vast library of works on strategy.' Antulio J Echevarria II, US Army War College `Gray is a prolific writer on strategy . . . It could be said that Gray has positioned himself in pole position as a strategic thinker. Few other contemporary writers can rival him, and none has been so consistent in trying to develop a general theory, distilled largely, but not entirely from Clauswitz's On War. ' Christopher Coker, RUSI Journal `what Gray has provided here is more than ample as a base line work for anyone who wishes to get serious about strategy.' William F. Owen, Infinity Journal