Wealth, Power, and Authoritarian Institutions: Comparing Dominant Parties and Parliaments in Tanzania and Uganda(Oxford Studies in African Politics and International Relations)

Through an analysis of the recent political history of Tanzania and Uganda, Wealth, Power, and Authoritarian Institutions offers a novel explanation of why authoritarian parties and legislatures vary in strength, and why this variation matters. Michaela Collord elaborates a view of authoritarian political institutions as both reflecting and magnifying elite power dynamics. While there are many sources of elite power, the book centres on material power. It outlines how diverse trajectories of state-led capitalist development engender differing patterns of wealth accumulation and elite contestation across regimes. These differences, in turn, influence institutional landscapes. Where accumulation is more closely controlled by state and party leaders, as was true in Tanzania until economic liberalization in the 1980s, rival factions remain subdued. Ruling parties can then consolidate relatively strong institutional structures, and parliament remains marginal. Conversely, where a class of private wealth accumulators expands, as occurred in Tanzania after the 1980s and in Uganda after the National Resistance Movement took power in 1986, rival factions can more easily form, simultaneously eroding party institutions and encouraging greater legislative strength. Collord uses this analysis to reassess the significance of a stronger legislature. She considers its influence on distributive politics, both regressive and progressive. She also considers its relation to democratization, particularly in a context of broader liberalizing reforms. The book ultimately encourages a closer examination of how would-be democratic institutions interact with an underlying power distribution, shaping in whose interests they operate. Oxford Studies in African Politics and International Relations is a series for scholars and students working on African politics and International Relations and related disciplines. Volumes concentrate on contemporary developments in African political science, political economy, and International Relations, such as electoral politics, democratization, decentralization, gender and political representation, the political impact of natural resources, the dynamics and consequences of conflict, comparative political thought, and the nature of the continent's engagement with the East and West. Comparative and mixed methods work is particularly encouraged. Case studies are welcomed but should demonstrate the broader theoretical and empirical implications of the study and its wider relevance to contemporary debates. The focus of the series is on sub-Saharan Africa, although proposals that explain how the region engages with North Africa and other parts of the world are of interest. General Editors Nic Cheeseman, Peace Medie, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira.

Table of Contents:
List of Figures List of Tables 1: Introduction 2: Wealth, Power, and Authoritarian Institutions 3: Authoritarian Party Consolidation 4: Authoritarian Party Trajectories 5: Legislative Institutional Strength 6: Legislative Influence 7: Conclusion Bibliography Index

About the Author :
Michaela Collord is an Assistant Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham. Her research focuses on the political economy of authoritarian rule and political institutions in developing countries. Her work also explores authoritarian strategies of urban political dominance and urban labour organizing. She has over a decade of experience working on politics and governance in East Africa and her research has been published in journals such as African Affairs, Democratization, Journal of Eastern African Studies, and Journal of Modern African Studies.

Review :
Collord's work is at the cutting edge of a new generation of work on party-state formation in African studies. She argues that different trajectories of politicised accumulation produce varying patterns of ruling party development. Her operational indicators of ruling party strength and cohesion provide secure footholds for future comparative research in this critical domain. This book sets a very high standard. A refreshing analysis of how wealth and power are distributed through state channels and elite contestations. Collord boldly combines political economy and institutional analysis to unpack the interplay between democracy and development. This is a must-read for those interested in the role of political parties, parliamentary institutions, and presidential changes in reshaping distributive politics across the authoritarian spectrum. Michaela Collord makes a compelling contribution to our understanding of the complex political and economic dynamics that underpin authoritarian institutions. Using meticulous research on the legislatures in two dominant party regimes Uganda and Tanzania, the book advances a fascinating argument about the socio-economic foundations of elite power. She traces the implications of different patterns of wealth accumulation and how this diversity shapes political contestation and participation. The book sheds new light on the contemporary political economy of Tanzania and Uganda. It also provides a timely contribution to our understanding of the often-opaque political processes within authoritarian regimes and their wider implications for socioeconomic change. Collord has produced a highly original and lucid account of power, parties, and legislatures in contemporary Africa. Employing a fresh and compelling theoretical perspective that is grounded in extensive empirical detail, Collord considers political party and legislative variation in Tanzania and Uganda. She argues persuasively that this institutional variation reflects differences in the distribution of power and wealth across authoritarian African regimes. Her book makes a valuable contribution to the literature on African political economy. Creatively designed and meticulously researched, this refreshing study makes a compelling argument about the kinds of authoritarian institutions produced by different sorts of new elite coalitions in African polities.